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Abstract
We develop theory for using heuristics to solve computationally hard problems in differ-
ential privacy. Heuristic approaches have enjoyed tremendous success in machine learning,
for which performance can be empirically evaluated. However, privacy guarantees cannot
be evaluated empirically, and must be proven — without making heuristic assumptions. We
show that learning problems over broad classes of functions — those that have polynomially
sized universal identification sets — can be solved privately and efficiently, assuming the ex-
istence of a non-private oracle for solving the same problem. Our first algorithm yields a
privacy guarantee that is contingent on the correctness of the oracle. We then give a reduc-
tion which applies to a class of heuristics which we call certifiable, which allows us to convert
oracle-dependent privacy guarantees to worst-case privacy guarantee that hold even when the
heuristic standing in for the oracle might fail in adversarial ways. Finally, we consider classes
of functions for which both they and their dual classes have small universal identification sets.
This includes most classes of simple boolean functions studied in the PAC learning literature,
including conjunctions, disjunctions, parities, and discrete halfspaces. We show that there is
an efficient algorithm for privately constructing synthetic data for any such class, given a non-
private learning oracle. This in particular gives the first oracle-efficient algorithm for privately
generating synthetic data for contingency tables. Themost intriguing question left open by our
work is whether or not every problem that can be solved differentially privately can be privately
solved with an oracle-efficient algorithm. While we do not resolve this, we give a barrier result
that suggests that any generic oracle-efficient reduction must fall outside of a natural class of
algorithms (which includes the algorithms given in this paper).
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1 Introduction
Differential privacy is compatible with a tremendous number of powerful data analysis tasks,
including essentially any statistical learning problem [KLN+11, CMS11, BST14] and the gener-
ation of synthetic data consistent with exponentially large families of statistics [BLR13, RR10,
HR10, GRU12, NTZ13]. Unfortunately, it is also beset with a comprehensive set of computa-
tional hardness results. Of course, it inherits all of the computational hardness results from the
(non-private) agnostic learning literature: for example, even the simplest learning tasks — like
finding the best conjunction or linear separator to approximately minimize classification error —
are hard [FGKP09, FGRW12, DOSW11]. In addition, tasks that are easy absent privacy constraints
can become hard when these constraints are added. For example, although information theoret-
ically, it is possible to privately construct synthetic data consistent with all d-way marginals for
d-dimensional data, privately constructing synthetic data for even 2-way marginals is computa-
tionally hard [UV10]. These hardness results extend even to providing numeric answers to more
than quadratically many statistical queries [Ull16].
How should we proceed in the face of pervasive computational hardness? We might take in-
spiration from machine learning, which has not been slowed, despite the fact that its most basic
problems (e.g. learning linear separators) are already hard even to approximate. Instead, the field
has employed heuristics with tremendous success — including exact optimization of convex sur-
rogate loss functions (as in the case of SVMs), decision tree heuristics, gradient based methods
for differentiable but non-convex problems (as in back-propogation for training neural networks),
and integer programming solvers (as in recent work on interpretable machine learning [UR16]).
Other fields such as operations research similarly have developed sophisticated heuristics includ-
ing integer program solvers and SAT solvers that are able to routinely solve problems that are hard
in the worst case.
The case of private data analysis is different, however. If we are only concerned with perfor-
mance (as is the case for most machine learning and combinatorial optimization tasks), we have
the freedom to try different heuristics, and evaluate our algorithms in practice. Thus the design
of heuristics that perform well in practice can be undertaken as an empirical science. In contrast,
differential privacy is an inherently worst-case guarantee that cannot be evaluated empirically
(see [GM18] for lower bounds for black-box testing of privacy definitions).
In this paper, we build a theory for how to employ non-private heuristics (of which there are
many, benefitting from many years of intense optimization) to solve computationally hard prob-
lems in differential privacy. Our goal is to guide the design of practical algorithms about which
we can still prove theorems:
1. We will aim to prove accuracy theorems under the assumption that our heuristics solve some
non-private problem optimally. We are happy to make this assumption when proving our ac-
curacy theorems, because accuracy is something that can be empirically evaluated on the
datasets that we are interested in. An assumption like this is also necessary, because we are
designing algorithms for problems that are computationally hard in the worst case. How-
ever:
2. We aim to prove that our algorithms are differentially private in the worst case, even under
the assumption that our heuristics might fail in an adversarial manner.
1
1.1 Overview of Our Results
Informally, we give a collection of results showing the existence of oracle-efficient algorithms for
privately solving learning and synthetic data generation problems defined by discrete classes of
functions Q that have a special (but common) combinatorial structure. One might initially ask
whether it is possible to give a direct reduction from a non-private but efficient algorithm for
solving a learning problem to an efficient private algorithm for solving the same learning problem
without requiring any special structure at all. However, this is impossible, because there are classes
of functions (namely those that have finite VC-dimension but infinite Littlestone dimension) that
are known to be learnable absent the constraint of privacy, but are not privately learnable in an
information-theoretic sense [BNSV15, ALMM18]. The main question we leave open is whether
being information theoretically learnable under the constraint of differential privacy is sufficient for
oracle-efficient private learning. We give a barrier result suggesting that it might not be.
Before we summarize our results in more detail, we give some informal definitions.
1.1.1 Definitions
We begin by defining the kinds of oracles that we will work with, and end-goals that we will aim
for. We will assume the existence of oracles for (non-privately) solving learning problems: for
example, an oracle which can solve the empirical risk minimization problem for discrete linear
threshold functions. Because ultimately oracles will be implemented using heuristics, we consider
two types of oracles:
1. Certifiable heuristic oracles might fail, but when they succeed, they come with a certificate
of success. Many heuristics for solving integer programs are certifiable, including cutting
planes methods and branch and bound methods. SAT Solvers (and any other heuristic for
solving a decision problem in NP) are also certifiable.
2. On the other had, some heuristics are non-certifiable. These heuristics might produce in-
correct answers, without any indication that they have failed. Support vector machines
and logistic regression are examples of non-certifiable heuristic oracles for learning linear
threshold functions.
We define an oracle-efficient non-robustly differentially private algorithm to be an algorithm that
runs in polynomial time in all relevant parameters given access to an oracle for some problem,
and has an accuracy guarantee and a differential privacy guarantee which may both be contingent
on the guarantees of the oracle — i.e. if the oracle is replaced with a heuristic, the algorithm
may no longer be differentially private. Although in certain situations (e.g when we have very
high confidence that our heuristics actually do succeed on all instances we will ever encounter) it
might be acceptable to have a privacy guarantee that is contingent on having an infallible oracle,
we would much prefer a privacy guarantee that held in the worst case. We say that an oracle-
efficient algorithm is robustly differentially private if its privacy guarantee is not contingent on
the behavior of the oracle, and holds in the worst case, even if an adversary is in control of the
heuristic that stands in for our oracle.
2
1.1.2 Learning and Optimization
Our first result is a reduction from efficient non-private learning to efficient private learning over
any class of functions Q that has a small universal identification set [GKS93]. A universal identi-
fication set of sizem is a set of m examples such that the labelling of these examples by a function
q ∈ Q is enough to uniquely identify q. Equivalently, a universal identification set can be viewed
as a separator set [SKS16]: for any pair of functions q , q′ ∈ Q, there must be some example x in
the universal identification set such that q(x) , q(x′). We will use these terms interchangeably
throughout the paper. We show that if Q has a universal identification set of sizem, then given an
oracle which solves the empirical risk minimization problem (non-privately) over Q, there is an
ǫ-differentially private algorithm with additional running time scaling linearly with m and error
scaling linearly withm2/ǫ that solves the private empirical riskminimization problem overQ. The
error can be improved to O(m1.5
√
log1/δ/ǫ), while satisfying (ǫ,δ)-differential privacy. Many well
studied discrete concept classes Q from the PAC learning literature have small universal iden-
tification sets. For example, in d dimensions, boolean conjunctions, disjunctions, parities, and
halfspaces defined over the hypercube have universal identification sets of size d. This means that
for these classes, our oracle-efficient algorithm has error that is larger than the generic optimal
(and computationally inefficient) learner from [KLN+11] by a factor of O(
√
d). Other classes of
functions also have small universal identification sets — for example, decision lists have univer-
sal identification sets of size d2.
The reduction described above has the disadvantage that not only its accuracy guarantees —
but also its proof of privacy— depend on the oracle correctly solving the empirical risk minimiza-
tion problem it is given; it is non-robustly differentially private. This shortcoming motivates our
main technical result: a generic reduction that takes as input any oracle-efficient non-robustly
differentially private algorithm (i.e. an algorithm whose privacy proof might depend on the
proper functioning of the oracle) and produces an oracle-efficient robustly differentially private
algorithm, whenever the oracle is implemented with a certifiable heuristic. As discussed above, this
class of heuristics includes the integer programming algorithms used in most commercial solvers.
In combinationwith our first result, we obtain robustly differentially private oracle-efficient learn-
ing algorithms for conjunctions, disjunctions, discrete halfspaces, and any other class of functions
with a small universal identification set.
1.1.3 Synthetic Data Generation
We then proceed to the task of constructing synthetic data consistent with a class of queries Q.
Following [HRU13, GGAH+14], we view the task of synthetic data generation as the process of
computing an equilibrium of a particular zero sum game played between a data player and a
query player. In order to compute this equilibrium, we need to be able to instantiate two objects
in an oracle-efficient manner:
1. a private learning algorithm for Q (this corresponds to solving the best response problem for
the “query player”), and
2. a no-regret learning algorithm for a dual class of functions Qdual that results from swapping
the role of the data element and the query function (this allows the “data player” to obtain
a diminishing regret bound in simulated play of the game).
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The no-regret learning algorithm need not be differentially private. From our earlier results,
we are able to construct an oracle-efficient robustly differentially private learning algorithm for Q
whenever it has a small universal identification set. On the other hand, Syrgkanis et al. [SKS16]
show how to obtain an oracle-efficient no regret learning algorithm for a class of functions under
the same condition. Hence, we obtain an oracle-efficient robustly differentially private synthetic
data generation algorithm for any class of functions Q for which both Q and Qdual have small
universal identification sets. Fortunately, this is the case for many interesting classes of functions,
including boolean disjunctions, conjunctions, discrete halfspaces, and parity functions. The result
is that we obtain oracle-efficient algorithms for generating private synthetic data for all of these
classes. We note that the oracle used by the data player need not be certifiable.
1.1.4 A Barrier Result
Finally, we exhibit a barrier to giving oracle-efficient private learning algorithms for all classes of
functions Q known to be privately learnable. We identify a class of private learning algorithms
called perturbed empirical risk minimizers (pERMs) which output the query that exactly minimizes
some perturbation of their empirical risk on the dataset. This class of algorithms includes the
ones we give in this paper, as well as many other differentially private learning algorithms, in-
cluding the exponential mechanism and report-noisy-min. We show that any private pERM can
be efficiently used as a no-regret learning algorithm with regret guarantees that depend on the
scale of the perturbations it uses. This allows us to reduce to a lower bound on the running time
of oracle-efficient online learning algorithms due to Hazan and Koren [HK16]. The result is that
there exist finite classes of queries Q such that any oracle-efficient differentially private pERM
algorithmmust introduce perturbations that are polynomially large in the size of |Q|, whereas any
such class is information-theoretically privately learnable with error that scales only with log |Q|.
The barrier implies that if oracle-efficient differentially private learning algorithms are as pow-
erful as inefficient differentially private learning algorithms, then these general oracle efficient
private algorithms must not be perturbed empirical risk minimizers. We conjecture that the set
of problems solvable by oracle-efficient differentially private learners is strictly smaller than the
set of problems solvable information theoretically under the constraint of differential privacy, but
leave this as our main open question.
1.2 Additional Related Work
Conceptually, the most closely related piece of work is the “DualQuery” algorithm of [GGAH+14],
which in the terminology of our paper is a robustly private oracle-efficient algorithm for generat-
ing synthetic data for k-waymarginals for constant k. The main idea in [GGAH+14] is to formulate
the private optimization problem that needs to be solved so that the only computationally hard
task is one that does not depend on private data. There are other algorithms that can straightfor-
wardly be put into this framework, like the projection algorithm from [NTZ13]. This approach
immediately makes the privacy guarantees independent of the correctness of the oracle, but sig-
nificantly limits the algorithm design space. In particular, the DualQuery algorithm (and the
oracle-efficient version of the projection algorithm from [NTZ13]) has running time that is pro-
portional to |Q|, and so can only handle polynomially sized classes of queries (which is why k
needs to be held constant). The main contribution of our paper is to be able to handle private
optimization problems in which the hard computational step is not independent of the private
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data. This is significantly more challenging, and is what allows us to give oracle-efficient robustly
private algorithms for constructing synthetic data for exponentially large families Q. It is also
what lets give oracle-efficient private learning algorithms over exponentially large Q for the first
time.
A recent line of work starting with the “PATE” algorithm [PAE+16] together with more re-
cent theoretical analyses of similar algorithms by Dwork and Feldman, and Bassily, Thakkar, and
Thakurta [DF18, BTT18] can be viewed as giving oracle-efficient algorithms for an easier learning
task, in which the goal is to produce a finite number of private predictions rather than privately
output the model that makes the predictions. These can be turned into oracle efficient algorithms
for outputting a private model under the assumption that the mechanism has access to an addi-
tional source of unlabeled data drawn from the same distribution as the private data, but that
does not need privacy protections. In this setting, there is no need to take advantage of any spe-
cial structure of the hypothesis classQ, because the information theoretic lower bounds on private
learning proven in [BNSV15, ALMM18] do not apply. In contrast, our results apply without the
need for an auxiliary source of non-private data.
Privately producing contingency tables, and synthetic data that encode them— i.e. the answers
to statistical queries defined by conjunctions of features — has been a key challenge problem in
differential privacy at least since [BCD+07]. Since then, a number of algorithms and hardness
results have been given [UV10, GHRU13, KRSU10, TUV12, HRS12, FK14, CTUW14]. This paper
gives the first oracle-efficient algorithm for generating synthetic data consistent with a full contin-
gency table, and the first oracle-efficient algorithm for answering arbitrary conjunctions to near
optimal error.
Technically, our work is inspired by Syrgkanis et al. [SKS16] who show how a small sepa-
rator set (equivalently a small universal identification set) can be used to derive oracle-efficient
no-regret algorithms in the contextual bandit setting. The small separator property has found
other uses in online learning, including in the oracle-efficient construction of nearly revenue
optimal auctions [DHL+17]. Hazan and Koren [HK16] show lower bounds for oracle-efficient
no-regret learning algorithms in the experts setting, which forms the basis of our barrier result.
More generally, there is a rich literature studying oracle-efficient algorithms in machine learning
[BDH+05, BBB+08, BILM16] and optimization [BTHKM15] as a means of dealing with worst-
case hardness, and more recently, for machine learning subject to fairness constraints [ABD+18,
KNRW18, AIK18].
We also make crucial use of a property of differentially private algorithms, first shown by
[CLN+16]: That when differentially private algorithms are run on databases of size nwith privacy
parameter ǫ ≈ 1/√n, then they have similar output distributions when run on datasets that are
sampled from the same distribution, rather than just on neighboring datasets. In [CLN+16], this
was used as a tool to show the existence of robustly generalizing algorithms (also known as dis-
tributionally private algorithms in [BLR13]). We prove a new variant of this fact that holds when
the datasets are not sampled i.i.d. and use it for the first time in an analysis to prove differential
privacy. The technique might be of independent interest.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Differential Privacy Tools
Let X denote a d-dimensional data domain (e.g. Rd or {0,1}d ). We write n to denote the size of a
dataset S . We call two data sets S,S ′ ∈ X n neighbors (written as S ∼ S ′) if S can be derived from S ′
by replacing a single data point with some other element of X .
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [DMNS06, DKM+06]). Fix ε,δ ≥ 0. A randomized algorithm
A : X ∗ →O is (ε,δ)-differentially private if for every pair of neighboring data sets S ∼ S ′ ∈ X ∗, and for
every event Ω ⊆ O:
Pr[A(S) ∈Ω] ≤ exp(ε)Pr[A(S ′) ∈Ω] + δ.
Differentially private computations enjoy two nice properties:
Theorem 1 (Post Processing [DMNS06, DKM+06]). Let A : X ∗→O be any (ε,δ)-differentially private
algorithm, and let f : O → O′ be any function. Then the algorithm f ◦ A : X ∗ → O′ is also (ε,δ)-
differentially private.
Post-processing implies that, for example, every decision process based on the output of a dif-
ferentially private algorithm is also differentially private.
Theorem 2 (Basic Composition [DMNS06, DKM+06]). Let A1 : X ∗ → O, A2 : O ×X ∗ → O′ be such
that A1 is (ε1,δ1)-differentially private, and A2(o, ·) is (ε2,δ2)-differentially private for every o ∈ O.
Then the algorithm A : X ∗→O′ defined as A(x) = A2(A1(x),x) is (ε1+ε2,δ1+δ2)-differentially private.
The Laplace distribution plays a fundamental role in differential privacy. The Laplace Distri-
bution centered at 0 with scale b is the distribution with probability density function Lap(z|b) =
1
2b e
− |z|b . We write X ∼ Lap(b) when X is a random variable drawn from a Laplace distribution
with scale b. Let f : X n → Rk be an arbitrary function. The ℓ1 sensitivity of f is defined to be
∆1(f ) = maxS∼S ′ ‖f (S)−f (S ′)‖1. The Laplace mechanism with parameter ε simply adds noise drawn
independently from Lap(
∆1(f )
ε ) to each coordinate of f (S).
Theorem 3 ([DMNS06]). The Laplace mechanism is ε-differentially private.
2.2 Statistical Queries and Separator Sets
We study learning (optimization) and synthetic data generation problems for statistical queries
defined over a data universe X . A statistical query over X is a function q : X → {0,1}. A statistical
query can represent, e.g. any binary classificationmodel or the binary loss function that it induces.
Given a dataset S ∈ X n, the value of a statistical query q on S is defined to be q(S) = 1n
n∑
i=1
q(Si). In
this paper, we will generally think about query classes Q that represent standard hypothesis classes
from learning theory – like conjunctions, disjunctions, halfspaces, etc.
In this paper, we will make crucial use of universal identification sets for classes of statistical
queries. Universal identification sets are equivalent to separator sets, defined (in a slightly more
general form) in [SKS16].
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Definition 2 ([GKS93, SKS16]). A set U ⊆ X is a universal identification set or separator set for a
class of statistical queries Q if for every pair of distinct queries q,q′ ∈ Q, there is an x ∈U such that:
q(x) , q(x′)
If |U | =m, then we say that Q has a separator set of size m.
Many classes of statistical queries defined over the boolean hypercube have separator sets
of size proportional to their VC-dimension. For example, boolean conjunctions, disjunctions,
halfspaces defined over the hypercube, and parity functions in d dimensions all have separator
sets of size d. When we solve learning problems over these classes, we will be interested in the set
of queries that define the 0/1 loss function over these classes: but as we observe in Appendix A, if
a hypothesis class has a separator set of size m, then so does the class of queries representing the
empirical loss for functions in that hypothesis class.
2.3 Learning and Synthetic Data Generation
We study private learning as empirical risk minimization (the connection between in-sample risk
and out-of-sample risk is standard, and follows from e.g. VC-dimension bounds [KV94] or di-
rectly from differential privacy (see e.g. [BST14, DFH+15])). Such problems can be cast as finding
a function q in a class Q that minimizes q(S), subject to differential privacy (observe that the
empirical risk of a hypothesis is a statistical query — see Appendix A). We will therefore study
minimization problems over classes of statistical queries generally:
Definition 3. We say that a randomized algorithmM : X n →Q is an (α,β)-minimizer forQ if for every
dataset S ∈ X n, with probability 1− β, it outputsM(S) = q such that:
q(S) ≤ argmin
q∗∈Q
q∗(S) +α
Synthetic data generation, on the other hand, is the problem of constructing a new dataset Sˆ
that approximately agrees with the original dataset with respect to a fixed set of statistical queries:
Definition 4. We say that a randomized algorithm M : X n → X ∗ is an (α,β)-accurate synthetic data
generation algorithm for Q if for every dataset S ∈ X n, with probability 1−β, it outputsM(S) = Sˆ such
that for all q ∈ Q:
|q(S)− q(Sˆ)| ≤ α
2.4 Oracles and Oracle Efficient Algorithms
We discuss several kinds of oracle-efficient algorithms in this paper. It will be useful for us to
study oracles that solve weighted generalizations of the minimization problem, in which each
datapoint xi ∈ S is paired with a real-valued weight wi . In the literature on oracle-efficiency in
machine learning, these are widely employed, and are known as cost-sensitive classification oracles.
Via a simple translation and re-weighting argument, they are no more powerful than unweighted
minimization oracles, but are more convenient to work with.
Definition 5. A weighted optimization oracle for a class of statistical queries Q is a function O∗ :
(X ×R)∗→Q takes as input a weighted datasetWD ∈ (X ×R)∗ and outputs a query q = O∗(WD) such
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that
q ∈ argmin
q∗∈Q
∑
(xi ,wi )∈WD
wiq
∗(xi).
In this paper, we will study algorithms that have access to weighted optimization oracles for
learning problems that are computationally hard. Since we do not believe that such oracles have
worst-case polynomial time implementations, in practice, we will instantiate such oracles with
heuristics that are not guaranteed to succeed. There are two failure modes for a heuristic: it
can fail to produce an output at all, or it can output an incorrect query. The distinction can be
important. We call a heuristic that might fail to produce an output, but never outputs an incorrect
solution a certifiable heuristic optimization oracle:
Definition 6. A certifiable heuristic optimization oracle for a class of queries Q is a polynomial time
algorithmO : (X×R)∗→ (Q∪⊥) that takes as input a weighted datasetWD ∈ (X×R)∗ and either outputs
O(WD) = q ∈ argminq∗∈Q
∑
(xi ,wi )∈WD
wiq
∗(xi ) or else outputs ⊥ (“Fail”). If it outputs a statistical query
q, we say the oracle has succeeded.
In contrast, a heuristic optimization oracle (that is not certifiable) has no guarantees of correct-
ness. Without loss of generality, such oracles never need to return “Fail” (since they can always
instead output a default statistical query in this case).
Definition 7. A (non-certifiable) heuristic optimization oracle for a class of queries Q is an arbitrary
polynomial time algorithm M : (X ×R)∗ →Q. Given a call to the oracle defined by a weighted dataset
WD ∈ (X ×R)∗ we say that the oracle has succeeded on this call up to error α if it outputs a query q
such that
∑
(xi ,wi )∈WD
wiq(xi ) ≤min
q∗∈Q
∑
(xi ,wi )∈WD
wiq
∗(xi)+α. If it succeeds up to error 0, we just say that the
heuristic oracle has succeeded. Note that there may not be any efficient procedure to determine whether
the oracle has succeeded up to error α.
We say an algorithm AO is (certifiable)-oracle dependent if throughout the course of its run
it makes a series of (possibly adaptive) calls to a (certifiable) heuristic optimization oracle O. An
oracle-dependent algorithm AO is oracle equivalent to an algorithm A if given access to a perfect
optimization oracle O∗, AO∗ induces the same distribution on outputs as A. We now state an
intuitive lemma (that could also be taken as a more formal definition of oracle equivalence). See
the Appendix for a proof.
Lemma 1. Let AO be a certifiable-oracle dependent algorithm that is oracle equivalent to A. Then
for any fixed input dataset S , there exists a coupling between A(S) and AO(S) such that Pr[AO(S) =
a|AO(S) ,⊥] = Pr[A(S) = a|AO (S) ,⊥].
We will also discuss differentially private heuristic optimization oracles, in order to state ad-
ditional consequences of our construction in Section 4. Note that because differential privacy pre-
cludes exact computations, differentially private heuristic oracles are necessarily non-certifiable,
and will never succeed up to error 0.
Definition 8. A weighted (ǫ,δ)-differentially private (α,β)-accurate learning oracle for a class of sta-
tistical queries Q is an (ǫ,δ) differentially private algorithm O : (X ×R)∗ → C that takes as input a
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weighted datasetWD ∈ (X ×R)∗ and outputs a query qpriv ∈ Q such that with probability 1− β:∑
(xi ,wi )∈WD
wiqpriv(xi)− argmin
q∗∈C
∑
(xi ,wi )∈WD
wiq
∗(xi ) ≤ α
We say that an algorithm is oracle-efficient if given access to an oracle (in this paper, always a
weighted optimization oracle for a class of statistical queries) it runs in polynomial time in the
length of its input, and makes a polynomial number of calls to the oracle. In practice, we will
be interested in the performance of oracle-efficient algorithms when they are instantiated with
heuristic oracles. Thus, we further require oracle-efficient algorithms to halt in polynomial time
even when the oracle fails. When we design algorithms for optimization and synthetic data gen-
eration problems, their (α,β)-accuracy guarantees will generally rely on all queries to the oracle
succeeding (possibly up to error O(α)). If our algorithms are merely oracle equivalent to differen-
tially private algorithms, then their privacy guarantees depend on the correctness of the oracle.
However, we would prefer that the privacy guarantee of the algorithm not depend on the success
of the oracle. We call such algorithms robustly differentially private.
Definition 9. An oracle-efficient algorithmM is (ǫ,δ)-robustly differentially private if it satisfies (ǫ,δ)-
differential privacy even under worst-case performance of a heuristic optimization oracle. In other words,
it is differentially private for every heuristic oracle O that it might be instantiated with.
We write that an oracle efficient algorithm is non-robustly differentially private to mean that
it is oracle equivalent to a differentially private algorithm.
3 Oracle Efficient Optimization
In this section, we show how weighted optimization oracles can be used to give differentially pri-
vate oracle-efficient optimization algorithms for many classes of queries with performance that is
worse only by a
√
d factor compared to that of the (computationally inefficient) exponential mech-
anism. The first algorithm we give is not robustly differentially private — that is, its differential
privacy guarantee relies on having access to a perfect oracle. We then show how to make that
algorithm (or any other algorithm that is oracle equivalent to a differentially private algorithm)
robustly differentially private when instantiated with a certifiable heuristic optimization oracle.
3.1 A (Non-Robustly) Private Oracle Efficient Algorithm
In this section, we give an oracle-efficient (non-robustly) differentially private optimization algo-
rithm that works for any class of statistical queries that has a small separator set. Intuitively, it is
attempting to implement the “Report-Noisy-Min” algorithm (see e.g. [DR14]), which outputs the
query q that minimizes a (perturbed) estimate qˆ(S) ≡ q(S)+Zq where Zq ∼ Lap(1/ε) for each q ∈ Q.
Because Report-Noisy-Min samples an independent perturbation for each query q ∈ Q, it is inef-
ficient: its run time is linear in |Q|. Our algorithm – “Report Separator-Perturbed Min” (RSPM) –
instead augments the dataset S in a way that implicitly induces perturbations of the query values
q(S). The perturbations are no longer independent across queries, and so to prove privacy, we
need to use the structure of a separator set.
The algorithm is straightforward: it simply augments the dataset with one copy of each ele-
ment of the separator set, each with a weight drawn independently from the Laplace distribution.
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All original elements in the dataset are assigned weight 1. The algorithm then simply passes this
weighted dataset to the weighted optimization oracle, and outputs the resulting query. The num-
ber of random variables that need to be sampled is therefore now equal to the size of the separator
set, instead of the size of Q. The algorithm is closely related to a no-regret learning algorithm
given in [SKS16] — the only difference is in the magnitude of the noise added, and in the analysis,
since we need a substantially stronger form of stability.
Report Separator-PerturbedMin (RSPM)
Given: A separator set U = {e1, . . . , em} for a class of statistical queries Q, a weighted optimization
oracle O∗ for Q, and a privacy parameter ǫ.
Input: A dataset S ∈ X n of size n.
Output: A statistical query q ∈ Q.
Sample ηi ∼ Lap(m/ǫ) for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
Construct a weighted datasetWD of size n+m as follows:
WD(S,η) = {(xi ,1) : xi ∈ S} ∪ {(ei ,ηi ) : ei ∈U }
Output q = O∗(WD(S,η)).
It is thus immediate that the Report Separator-Perturbed Min algorithm is oracle-efficient
whenever the size of the separator set m is polynomial: it simply augments the dataset with a
single copy of each of m separator elements, makes m draws from the Laplace distribution, and
then makes a single call to the oracle:
Theorem 4. The Report Separator-Perturbed Min algorithm is oracle-efficient.
The accuracy analysis for the Report Separator-Perturbed Min algorithm is also straightfor-
ward, and follows by bounding the weighted sum of the additional entries added to the original
data set.
Theorem 5. The Report Separator-Perturbed Min algorithm is an (α,β)-minimizer for Q for:
α =
2m2 log(m/β)
ǫn
Proof. Let q′ be the query returned by RSPM, and let q∗ be the trueminimizer q∗ = argminq∈Q q∗(S).
Then we show that with probability 1−β,q′(S) ≤ q∗(S)+α. By the CDF of the Laplace distribution
and a union bound over the m random variables ηi , we have that with probability 1− β:
∀i, |ηi | ≤
m log(m/β)
ǫ
.
Since for every query q, q(ei) ∈ [0,1], this means that with probability 1 − β, q′(WD) ≥ q′(S) −m ·
m log(m/β)
ǫn . Similarly q
∗(WD) ≤ q∗(S) +m · m log(m/β)ǫn . Combining these bounds gives:
q′(S) ≤ q′(WD) +m2 log(m/β)
ǫn
≤ q∗(WD) +m2 log(m/β)
ǫn
≤ q∗(S) + 2m
2 log(m/β)
ǫn
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as desired, where the second inequality follows because by definition, q′ is the true minimizer on
the weighted datasetWD.
Remark 1. We can bound the expected error of RSPM using Theorem 5 as well. If we denote the error of
RSPM by E, we’ve shown that for all β, Pr
[
E ≥ 2m2 log(m/β)ǫn
]
≤ β. Thus Pr
[
ǫnE
2m2
− logm ≥ log(1/β)
]
≤ β
for all β. Let E˜ =max(0, ǫnE
2m2
− logm). Since E˜ is non-negative:
E
[
E˜
]
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr
[
E˜ ≥ t
]
≤
∫ ∞
0
e−t = 1.
Hence ǫnE[E]
2m2
− logm ≤ E
[
E˜
]
≤ 1, and so E [E] ≤ 2m2ǫn (1 + logm).
The privacy analysis is more delicate, and relies on the correctness of the oracle.
Theorem 6. If O∗ is a weighted optimization oracle for Q, then the Report Separator-Perturbed Min
algorithm is ǫ-differentially private.
Proof. We begin by introducing some notation. Given a weighted dataset WD(S,η), and a query
q ∈ Q, let q(S,η) = q(S) +∑ei∈U q(ei)ηi be the value when q is evaluated on the weighted dataset
given the realization of the noise η. To allow us to distinguish queries that are output by the
algorithm on different datasets and different realizations of the perturbations, write Q(S,η) =
O∗(WD(S,η)). Fix any q ∈ Q, and define:
E(q,S) = {η : Q(S,η) = q}
to be the event defined on the perturbations η that the mechanism outputs query q. Given a fixed
q ∈ Q we define a mapping fq(η) : Rm→ Rm on noise vectors as follows:
1. If q(ei) = 1, fq(η)i = ηi − 1
2. If q(ei) = 0, fq(η)i = ηi +1
Equivalently, fq(η)i = ηi + (1− 2q(ei)).
We now make a couple of observations about the function fq.
Lemma 2. Fix any qˆ ∈ Q and any pair of neighboring datasets S,S ′ . Let η ∈ E(qˆ,S) be such that qˆ is the
unique minimizer qˆ ∈ infq∈Q q(S,η). Then fqˆ(η) ∈ E(qˆ,S ′). In particular, this implies that for any such
η:
1(η ∈ E(qˆ,S)) ≤ 1(fqˆ(η) ∈ E(qˆ,S ′))
Proof. For this argument, it will be convenient to work with un-normalized versions of our queries,
so that q(S) =
∑
xi∈S q(xi ) — i.e. we do not divide by the dataset size n. Note that this change
of normalization does not change the identity of the minimizer. Under this normalization, the
queries q are now 1-sensitive, rather than 1/n sensitive.
Recall that Q(S,η) = qˆ. Suppose for point of contradiction that Q(S ′ , fqˆ(η)) = q˜ , qˆ. This in
particular implies that q˜(S ′ , fqˆ(η)) ≤ qˆ(S ′ , fqˆ(η)).
We first observe that qˆ(S ′ ,η)− q˜(S ′ ,η) < 1. This follows because:
q˜(S ′ ,η) ≥ q˜(S,η)− 1 > qˆ(S,η)− 1 (1)
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Here the first inequality follows because the un-normalized queries q are 1-sensitive, and the
second follows because qˆ ∈ argminq∈Q q(S,η) is the unique minimizer.
Next, we write:
q˜(S ′ , fqˆ(η))− qˆ(S ′ , fqˆ(η)) = q˜(S ′ ,η)− qˆ(S ′ ,η) +
m∑
i=1
(q˜(ei)− qˆ(ei))(fqˆ(ηi)− ηi)
Consider each term in the final sum: (q˜(ei)− qˆ(ei))(fqˆ(ηi)− ηi). Observe that by construction, each
of these terms is non-negative: Clearly if q˜(ei) = qˆ(ei), then the term is 0. Further, if q˜(ei) , qˆ(ei),
then by construction, (q˜(ei )− qˆ(ei))(fqˆ(ηi)− ηi) = 1. Finally, by the definition of a separator set, we
know that there is at least one index i such that q˜(ei) , qˆ(ei). Thus, we can conclude:
q˜(S ′ , fqˆ(η))− qˆ(S ′ , fqˆ(η)) ≥ q˜(S ′ ,η)− qˆ(S ′ ,η) + 1 > 0
where the final inequality follows from applying inequality 1. But rearranging, this means that
qˆ(S ′ , fqˆ(η)) < q˜(S ′ , fqˆ(η)), which contradicts the assumption that Q(S ′ , fqˆ(η)) = q˜.
Let p denote the probability density function of the joint distribution of the Laplace random
variables η, and by abuse of notation also of each individual ηi .
Lemma 3. For any r ∈ Rm,q ∈ Q:
p(η = r) ≤ eǫp(η = fq(r))
Proof. For any index i and z ∈ R, we have p(ηi = z) = ǫ2me−|z|ǫ/m. In particular, if |x − y| ≤ 1,
p(ηi = y) ≤ eǫ/mp(ηi = x). Since for all i and r ∈Rm |fq(r)i − ri | ≤ 1, we have:
p(η = fq(r))
p(η = r)
=
m∏
i=1
p(ηi = fq(r)i)
p(ηi = ri)
≤
m∏
i=1
eǫ/m = eǫ .
Lemma 4. Fix any class of queries Q that has a finite separator set U = {e1, . . . , em}. For every dataset S
there is a subset B ⊆ Rm such that:
1. Pr[η ∈ B] = 0 and
2. On the restricted domain Rm \B, there is a unique minimizer q′ ∈ argminq∈Q q(S,η)
Proof. Let:
B = {η :
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣argminq∈Q (q(S) +
m∑
i=1
ηiq(ei))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 1}
be the set of η values that do not result in unique minimizers q′.
Because Q is a finite set1, by a union bound it suffices to show that for any two distinct queries
q1,q2 ∈ Q,
Pr
η
q1(S) +
m∑
i=1
ηiq1(ei ) = q2(S) +
m∑
i=1
ηiq2(ei)
 = 0.
1Any class of queries Q with a separator set of size m can be no larger than 2m.
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This follows from the continuity of the Laplace distribution. Let i be any index such that q1(ei) ,
q2(ei) (recall that by the definition of a separator set, such an index is guaranteed to exist). For any
fixed realization of {ηj }j,i , there is a single value of ηi that equalizes q1(S,η) and q2(S,η). But any
single value is realized with probability 0.
We now have enough to complete the proof. We have for any query qˆ:
Pr[RSPM(S) = qˆ] = Pr[η ∈ E(qˆ,S)]
=
∫
Rm
p(η)1(η ∈ E(qˆ,S))dη
=
∫
Rm\B
p(η)1(η ∈ E(qˆ,S))dη B has 0 measure. (Lemma 4)
≤
∫
Rm\B
p(η)1(fqˆ(η) ∈ E(qˆ,S ′))dη Lemma 4 =⇒ Lemma 2
≤
∫
Rm\B
eǫp(fqˆ(η))1(fqˆ(η) ∈ E(qˆ,S ′))dη Lemma 3
≤
∫
Rm\fqˆ(B)
eǫp(η)1(η ∈ E(qˆ,S ′))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∂fqˆ∂η
∣∣∣∣∣∣dη Change of variables η→ fqˆ(η)
=
∫
Rm
eǫp(η)1(η ∈ E(qˆ,S ′))dη fqˆ(B) has 0 measure,
∣∣∣∣∣∣∂fqˆ∂η
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1
= eǫ Pr[η ∈ E(qˆ,S ′)]
= eǫ Pr[RSPM(S ′) = qˆ]
In Appendix B, we give a somewhat more complicated analysis to show that by using Gaussian
perturbations rather than Laplace perturbations, it is possible to improve the accuracy of the
RSPM algorithm by a factor of
√
m, at the cost of satisfying (ǫ,δ)-differential privacy:
Theorem 7. The Gaussian RSPM algorithm is (ǫ,δ)-differentially private, and is an oracle-efficient
(α,β)-minimizer for any class of functions Q that has a universal identifications sequence of size m for:
α =O
m
√
m ln(m/β) ln(1/δ)
εn

See Appendix B for the algorithm and its analysis.
It is instructive to compare the accuracy that we can obtain with oracle-efficient algorithms to
the accuracy that can be obtained via the (inefficient, and generally optimal) exponential mecha-
nism based generic learner from [KLN+11]. The existence of a universal identification set for Q of
size m implies |Q| ≤ 2m (and for many interesting classes of queries, including conjunctions, dis-
junctions, parities, and discrete halfspaces over the hypercube, this is an equality— see Appendix
A). Thus, the exponential-mechanism based learner from [KLN+11] is (α,β)-accurate for:
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α =O
(
m+ log(1/β)
ǫn
)
.
Comparing this bound to ours, we see that we can obtain oracle-efficiency at a cost of roughly
a factor of
√
m in our error bound. Whether or not this cost is necessary is an interesting open
question.
We can conclude that for a wide range of hypothesis classes Q including boolean conjunc-
tions, disjunctions, decision lists, discrete halfspaces, and several families of circuits of logarith-
mic depth (see Appendix A) there is an oracle-efficient differentially private learning algorithm
that obtains accuracy guarantees within small polynomial factors of the optimal guarantees of the
(inefficient) exponential mechanism.
3.2 A Robustly Differentially Private Oracle-Efficient Algorithm
The RSPM algorithm is not robustly differentially private, because its privacy proof depends on
the oracle succeeding. This is an undesirable property for RSPM and other algorithms like it,
because we do not expect to have access to actual oracles for hard problems even if we expect that
there are certain families of problems for which we can reliably solve typical instances2. In this
section, we show how to remedy this: we give a black box reduction, starting from a (non-robustly)
differentially private algorithmAO that is implemented using a certifiable heuristic3 oracle O, and
producing a robustly differentially private algorithm A˜O for solving the same problem. A˜O will be
(ǫ,δ)-differentially private for a parameter δ that we may choose, and will have a factor of roughly
O˜(1/δ) running time overhead on top of AO . So if AO is oracle efficient, so is A˜O whenever the
chosen value of δ ≥ 1/poly(n). If the oracle never fails, then we can prove utility guarantees for
it when AO has such guarantees, since it just runs AO (using a smaller privacy parameter) on a
random sub-sample of the original dataset. But the privacy guarantees hold even in the worst case
of the behavior of the oracle. We call this reduction the Private Robust Subsampling Meta Algorithm
or PRSMA.
3.2.1 Intuition and Proof Outline
Before we describe the analysis of PRSMA, a couple of remarks are helpful in order to set the
stage.
1. At first blush, one might be tempted to assert that if an oracle-efficient non-robustly dif-
ferentially private algorithm is implemented using a certifiable heuristic oracle, then it will
sample from a differentially private distribution conditioned on the event that the heuristic
oracle doesn’t fail. But a moment’s thought reveals that this isn’t so: the possibility of fail-
ures both on the original dataset S and on the (exponentially many) neighboring datasets S ′
can substantially change the probabilities of arbitrary eventsΩ, and how these probabilities
differ between neighboring datasets.
2There may be situations in which it is acceptable to use non robustly differentially private oracle-efficient algo-
rithms — for example, if the optimization oracle is so reliable that it has never been observed to fail on the domain of
interest. But robust differential privacy provides a worst-case guarantee which is preferable.
3We recall that heuristics for solving integer programs (such as cutting planes methods, branch and bound, and
branch and cut methods, as implemented in commercial solvers) and SAT solvers are certifiable.
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Private Robust Subsampling Meta Algorithm (PRSMA)
Given: Privacy parameters ǫ,δ ≥ 0 and an oracle-efficient differentially private algorithm AǫO :
X n →M, implemented with a certifiable heuristic oracle O.
Input: A dataset S ∈ X n of size n.
Output: An output m ∈M or ⊥ (“Fail”).
1: Randomly partition S into K = 1ǫ (1+ log(
2
δ )) equally sized datasets {Si}Ki=1. (If n is not divisible
by K , first discard n mod K elements at random.)
2: for i = 1 . . .K do
3: Set oi = PASS
4: for t = 1 . . .
log(K/δ)
δ do
5: Compute Aǫ′O (Si) = ait , where ǫ′ = 1√8 nK log(2K/δ)
6: If ait = ⊥, set oi =⊥
7: end for
8: end for
9: Compute T = #{oi ,⊥}. Let T˜ = T + z, where z ∼ Lap(1ǫ ).
10: Test if T˜ > 1ǫ (1 + log(
1
δ )), if no output ⊥ and halt. Else:
11: Sample a uniformly at random from {ait : oi ,⊥}.
12: Output a.
2. Next, one might think of the following simple candidate solution: Run the algorithm AO(S)
roughly O˜(1/δ) many times in order to check that the failure probability of the heuristic
algorithm on S is≪ δ, and then output a sample of AO(S) only if this is so. But this doesn’t
work either: the failure probability itself will change if we replace S with a neighboring
dataset S ′, and so this won’t be differentially private. In fact, there is no reason to think that
the failure probability of AO will be a low sensitivity function of S , so there is no way to
privately estimate the failure probability to non-trivial error.
It is possible to use the subsample-and-aggregate procedure of [NRS07] to randomly partition
the dataset into K pieces Si , and privately estimate on how many of these pieces AO(Si) fails with
probability≪ δ. The algorithm can then then fail if this private count is not sufficiently large. In
fact, this is the first thing that PRSMA does, in lines 1-10, setting oi = PASS for those pieces Si
such that it seems that the probability of failure is≪ δ, and setting oi =⊥ for the others.
But the next step of the algorithm is to randomly select one of the partition elements Si
amongst the set that passed the earlier test: i.e. amongst the set such that oi , ⊥ — and re-
turn one of the outputs a that had been produced by running AO(Si). It is not immediately clear
why this should be private, becausewhich partition elements passed the test {i : oi ,⊥} is not itself
differentially private. Showing that this results in a differentially private output is the difficult
part of the analysis.
To get an idea of the problem that we need to overcome, consider the following situation
which our analysis must rule out: Fix a partition of the dataset S1, . . . ,SK , and imagine that each
partition element passes: we have oi , ⊥ for all i. Now suppose that there is some event Ω such
that Pr[AO(S1) ∈Ω] ≥ 1/2, but Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω] is close to 0 for all i , 1. Since K ≈ 1/ǫ, and the final
output is drawn from a uniformly random partition element, this means that PRSMA outputs an
element ofΩ with probabilityΩ(ǫ). Suppose that on a neighboring dataset S ′ , S1 no longer passes
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the test and has o1 = ⊥. Since it is no longer a candidate to be selected at the last step, we now
have that on S ′, PRSMA outputs an element of Ω with probability close to 0. This is a violation
of (ǫ,δ)-differential privacy for any non-trivial value of δ (i.e. δ ≤O(ǫ)).
The problem is that (fixing a partition of S into S1, . . . ,SK ) moving to a neighboring dataset S
′
can potentially arbitrarily change the probability that any single element Si survives to step 11 of
the algorithm, which can in principle change the probability of arbitrary events Ω by an additive
±O(ǫ) term, rather than a multiplicative 1±O(ǫ) factor.
Since we are guaranteed that (with high probability) if we make it to step 11 without failing,
then at least Ω(1/ǫ) elements Si have survived with oi , ⊥, it would be sufficient for differential
privacy if for every eventΩ, the probabilities Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω] were within a constant factor of each
other, for all i. Then a change of whether a single partition element Si survives with oi , ⊥ or not
would only add or remove an ǫ fraction of the total probability mass on eventΩ. While this seems
like a “differential-privacy” like property, but it is not clear that the fact that AO∗ is differentially
private can help us here, because the partition elements Si ,Sj are not neighboring datasets — in
fact, they are disjoint. But as we show, it does in fact guarantee this property if we set the privacy
parameter ǫ′ to be sufficiently small — to roughly O(1/
√
n/K) in step 5.
With this intuition setting the stage, the roadmap of the proof is as follows. For notational
simplicity, we write A(·) to denote AO∗(·), the oracle-efficient algorithm when implemented with
a perfect oracle.
1. We observe that ǫ-differential privacy implies that the log-probability of any event Ω when
A(·) is run on Si changes by less than an additive factor of ǫwhen an element of Si is changed.
We use a method of bounded differences argument to show that this implies that the log-
probability density function concentrates around its expectation, where the randomness is
over the subsampling of Si from S . A similar result is proven in [CLN
+16] to show that
differentially private algorithms achieve what they call “perfect generalization.” We need
to prove a generalization of their result because in our case, the elements of Si are not se-
lected independently of one another. This guides our choice of ǫ′ in step 5 of the algorithm.
(Lemma 5)
2. We show that with high probability, for every Si such that oi , ⊥ after step 10 of the algo-
rithm, AO(Si) fails with probability at most O(δ). By Lemma 1, this implies that it is δ-close
in total variation distance to A(Si).
3. We observe that fixing a partition, on a neighboring dataset, only one of the partition ele-
ments Si changes — and hence changes its probability of having oi , ⊥. Since with high
probability, conditioned on PRSMA not failing, Ω(1/ǫ) partition elements survive with
oi , ⊥, parts 1 and 2 imply that changing a single partition element Si only changes the
probability of realizing any outcome event by a multiplicative factor of ≈ 1+ ǫ.
3.2.2 The Main Theorem
Theorem 8. PRSMA is (ǫ,δ) differentially private when given as input:
1. An oracle-efficient non-robustly differentially private algorithmAO implemented with a certifiable
heuristic oracle O, and
2. Privacy parameters (ǫ∗,δ∗) where ǫ∗ = ǫ62 ≤ 12 and δ∗ = δ11 ≤ 12 .
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Proof. We analyze PRSMA with privacy parameters ǫ and δ, optimizing the constants at the end.
Fix an input dataset S with |S | = n, and an adjacent dataset S ′ ∼ S , such that without loss of
generality S,S ′ differ in the element x1 , x′1. We denote the PRSMA routine with input AO and
dataset S by AprsmO (S ). We first observe that:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) = ⊥] ≤ eǫ Pr[A
prsm
O (S ′) = ⊥]
This is immediate since the indicator for a failure is a post-processing of the Laplace mechanism.
Since x1 can affect at most one oracle failure, T is 1-sensitive, and so publishing T˜ = T + Lap(
1
ǫ )
satisfies ǫ-differential privacy since it is an invocation of the Laplace Mechanism defined in Sec-
tion 2.1. (This can also be viewed as an instantiation of the “sub-sample and aggregate procedure
of [NRS07]).
We now proceed to the meat of the argument. To establish (ǫ,δ) differential privacy we must
reason about the probability of arbitrary eventsΩ ⊂M, rather than just individual outputs a. We
want to show:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω] ≤ eǫ Pr[A
prsm
O (S ′) ∈Ω] + δ
We first fix some notation and define a number of events that we will need to reason about.
Let:
• P Ssplit be the uniform distribution over equal sized partitions of S that the datasets Si are
drawn from in line 1; i.e. P (S) ∼ P Ssplit , where P (S) is the partition of S into {Si}.
• A denote AO∗ , our oracle-efficient algorithm when instantiated with a perfect oracle O∗. i.e.
A(S) is the ǫ-differentially private distribution that we ideally want to sample from.
• Z be the event that the Laplace noise z in step 10 of PRSMA has magnitude greater than
1
ǫ (log(
2
δ )).
• F =
{
{oi } : |{oi : oi , ⊥}| > 1ǫ
}
. We will use o to denote a particular set {oi }. Let Iopass be the set
{i : oi ,⊥}. Given o ∈ F , let |o| denote |Iopass |.
• E be the event that for all i = 1 . . .K : Pr[AO(Si) =⊥] ≥ δ⇒ oi =⊥.
• i∗ denote the index i of the randomly chosen ait in step 11 of PRSMA.
• Q be the event that the draw P (S) ∼ P Ssplit is such that the probabilities ofA outputting a ∈Ω
when run on any two Si ,Sj ∈ P (S) are within a multiplicative factor of 2. Lemma 5 formally
defines Q and shows Pr[Q] ≥ 1− δ. Let SQ denote the set of P (S) on which event Q holds.
We now bound the probabilities of several of these events. By the CDF of the Laplace distribution,
we have Pr[Z] = Pr
[
|z| > 1ǫ log(1/δ)
]
= e−ǫ·
1
ǫ log(1/δ) = δ, and by a union bound:
Pr[E] ≥ 1−K · (1− δ)(log(K/δ)/δ) ≥ 1−K · e−δ·log(K/δ)/δ = 1− δ.
Let L be the event Zc ∩E. By the above calculation and another union bound, Pr[L] ≥ 1−2δ. Our
proof now proceeds via a sequence of lemmas. All missing proofs appear in Appendix C. We first
show that Q occurs with high probability.
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Lemma 5. Let P (S) ∼ P Ssplit . Let A : X l → M be an (ǫ′ ,0) differentially private algorithm, where:
ǫ′ = 1√
8 nK log(2K/δ)
. Fix Ω ⊂M , and let qΩ(Si) = logPr[A(Si) ∈Ω]. Define Q to be the event
Q = {P (S) : max
i,j∈1...K
|qΩ(Si)− qΩ(Sj )| ≤ 2}.
Then over the random draw of P (S) ∼ P Ssplit , Pr[Q] ≥ 1− δ.
The proof relies on the fact that qΩ(·) is ǫ-Lipschitz. This result is similar to Theorem 5.4
in [CLN+16], although in our case sampling without replacement induces dependence among
the elements in Si , and thus we can’t appeal to standard concentration inequalities for indepen-
dent random variables. Instead we prove that elements sampled without replacement from a
fixed set satisfy a type of negative dependence called stochastic covering, and are n/K-homogenous
(supported on a set of size n/K), which are used to prove exponential concentration of Lipschitz
functions in [PP14]. We defer the details to the Appendix.
To establish the theorem we want to show that given an adjacent database S ′ differing only in
the first element from S , that
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω]
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
≤ eǫ∗ + δ
∗
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
(2)
Our analysis will proceed by expanding the numerator by first conditioning on L, and then
on particular realizations of the partition P (S), and on a fixed realization of o = {oi }. We can also
restrict our attention to only summing over P (S) ∈ SQ, by showing that the terms corresponding
to P (S) ∈ ScQ contribute at most an additive factor of 2δ to the final probability. We will also only
sum over o ∈ F since conditioned on Zc, which is implied by L, these are the only o such that
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|o] , 0.
Lemma 6.
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω]
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
≤
∑
P (S)∈SQ,o∈F
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] + 4δ
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
The rest of the proof will consist of upper bounding the individual terms
Pr[AprsmO (S)∈Ω|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L]
Pr[AprsmO (S ′ )∈Ω]
.
Lemma 7 is a tool used to prove Lemma 8, which upper bounds the numerator, and Lemma 9
lower bounds the denominator. The conclusion of the argument consists of manipulations to
upper bound the ratio of these two bounds.
We first analyze the Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈ Ω|P(S),o,L] term, for P (S) ∈ SQ,o ∈ F . Conditioned on
Zc, if o ∈ F , then PRSMA passes the test in step 10 and outputs a randomly chosen ait : i ∈ Iopass .
Fixing a sampled value i∗ ∈ Iopass , ai∗t is distributed identically to a ∼ AO(Si∗)|AO(Si∗) ,⊥, since after
conditioning on Si∗ each ai∗t is drawn iid and the event oi , ⊥ does not depend on the sampled
values ait . In other words, Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|i∗ = i,P(S),o] = Pr[AO(Si∗) ∈Ω|AO(Si∗) ,⊥], and so:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L] =
1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass
Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO(Si) ,⊥] (3)
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Substituting in 3 we have:
∑
P (S)∈SQ,o∈F
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] =
∑
P (S)∈SQ,o∈F
1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass
Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO(Si) ,⊥]Pr[o,P(S)|L]
We now use the fact that P (S) ∈ SQ, to show that none of the terms Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO (Si) , ⊥]
in the right hand side of Equation 3 individually represent a substantial fraction of the total
probability mass. Conditioning on L ensures that if oi , ⊥ then Pr[AO(Si) = ⊥] ≤ δ, which means
AO(Si) is δ-close in total variation distance toA(Si ). By Lemma 5, with high probability anyA(Si)
is approximately equally likely to output an element in Ω, which allows us to bound the effect
that changing a single data point (and hence a single Si) can have on the probability of outputting
an element inΩ.
Lemma 7. Fix any o, any P (S) ∈ SQ, and index j ∈ Iopass , i.e. oj ,⊥. Then:
Pr[AO(Sj ) ∈Ω|AO(Sj ) ,⊥,L] ≤
e2
(1− δ)2
1
|o| − 1
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,j
Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO(Si) ,⊥] +
δe2
(1− δ)
Without loss of generality (up to renaming of partition elements), assume that the element on
which S and S ′ differ falls into S1. Now we break the summation over O into two pieces, depend-
ing on whether o1 = ⊥ or o1 , ⊥. We will use Lemma 7 to bound terms involving Pr[AO(S1) ∈
Ω|AO(S1) ,⊥,L], since S1 is the only partition where Si , S ′i .∑
P(S)∈SQ
(∑
o∈F
( 1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass
Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO(Si) ,⊥]
)
Pr[o|P(S)]
)
Pr[P(S)] =
∑
P(S)∈SQ
( ∑
o∈F :o1,⊥
( 1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass
Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO (Si) ,⊥]
)
Pr[o|P(S)] +
∑
o∈F :o1=⊥
( 1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass
Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO(Si) ,⊥]
)
Pr[o|P(S)
)
Pr[P(S)]
Lemma 8. ∑
P (S)∈SQ,o∈F
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] ≤
(1 +
e2
(1− δ)2(1ǫ − 1)
)
∑
P(S)∈SQ
(∑
o∈F
( 1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,1
Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO(Si) ,⊥]
)
Pr[o|P(S)]
)
Pr[P(S)] +
ǫδe2
1− δ
We now condition on a fixed partition P(S ′) in the denominator as well. Given a fixed partition
P(S) of S , define the adjacent partition P (S ′) ∼ P (S) as the partition of an adjacent database S ′ such
that for all i , 1, Si = S
′
i , and S1,S
′
1 differ only in x1 , x
′
1, where x1 is the differing element between
S,S ′ . Let S ′Q be the set of P (S ′) adjacent to P (S) ∈ SQ, i.e. S ′Q = {P (S ′) : ∃ P (S) ∈ SQ,P (S ′) ∼ P (S)}.
We now lower bound the denominator in Lemma 6, which follows by conditioning on o,P (S ′),
and then dropping some (non-negative) terms.
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Lemma 9.
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω] ≥
∑
P(S ′)∈S ′Q
(
∑
o∈F
(
1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,1
Pr[AO(S ′i ) ∈Ω|AO(S ′i ) ,⊥])Pr[o|P(S ′)])Pr[P(S ′)]
Thus by Lemmas 8 and 9,
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L]
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
≤
(1 + e
2
(1−δ)2( 1ǫ−1)
)
∑
P(S)∈SQ
(∑
o∈F
( 1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,1
Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO(Si) ,⊥]Pr[o|P(S)]
)
Pr[P(S)]
)
∑
P(S ′)∈S ′Q
(
∑
o∈F
(
1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass
Pr[AO(S ′i ) ∈Ω|AO(S ′i ) ,⊥])Pr[o|P(S ′)])Pr[P(S ′)]
+
ǫδe2
1−δ
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
(4)
For all P (S),P (S ′),Pr[P (S)] = Pr[P (S ′)], and we can bound the ratio of the summations over
SQ,S
′
Q by the supremum of the ratio. Hence (4) ≤
sup
P(S)∼P(S ′)
(1 + e
2
(1−δ)2( 1ǫ −1)
)
∑
o∈F
( 1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,1
Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO(Si) ,⊥]Pr[o|P(S)]
)
∑
o∈F
(
1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass
Pr[AO(S ′i ) ∈Ω|AO(S ′i ) ,⊥]Pr[o|P(S ′)])
+
ǫδe2
1−δ
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
(5)
Now since for all i , 1,Si = S
′
i , if we could control the ratio Pr[o|P (S)]/ Pr[o|P (S ′)] we would
be done. But this ratio could potentially be unbounded, as Pr[o1|P(S)] could be nonzero, and the
substitution of x′1 for x1 could force failure on the first partition S
′
1, and so Pr[o1|P(S ′)] = 0.
Given o let o−1 denote {o2, . . . oK }. The remainder of the argument circumvents this obstacle by
decomposing the outer summation over o ∈ F into a summation over the indicators of all but the
first failure event (o−1), and integrating out the probability of the first failure event (o1) from the
joint probability Pr[o|P(S)]. This trick will be applied in the numerator and denominator, with a
slight difference corresponding to an upper and a lower bound respectively. See the end of Section
C of the Appendix for details. Following the chain of inequalities, we finally obtain:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L]
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
≤ (1 + e
2
(1− δ)2(1ǫ − 1)
)
1
1− ǫ +
ǫδe2
1−δ
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
,
which substituting into Lemma 6 gives:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω] ≤ (1 +
e2
(1− δ)2(1ǫ − 1)
)
1
1− ǫPr[A
prsm
O (S ′) ∈Ω] + 4δ+
ǫδe2
1− δ
For ǫ,δ ≤ 1/2, (1+ e2
(1−δ)2( 1ǫ−1)
) 11−ǫ ≤ e8e
2ǫ+ǫ+ǫ2 , which establishes that PRSMA is (8e2ǫ+ǫ+ǫ2,4δ+
ǫδe2
1−δ ) differentially private. Setting ǫ = ǫ
∗,δ = δ∗ completes the proof.
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We now turn to PRSMA’s accuracy guarantees. Note that when PRSMA starts with an algo-
rithmAO∗ instantiated with a perfect oracle O∗, it with high probability outputs the result of run-
ning AO∗ on a subsampled dataset Si of size n/K ≈ ǫn, with privacy parameter ǫ′ = 1√
8 nK log(2K/δ)
.
In general, therefore, the accuracy guarantees of PRSMA depend on how robust the guarantees of
A are to subsampling, which is typical of “Subsample and Aggregate” approaches, and also to its
specific privacy-accuracy tradeoff. Learning algorithms are robust to sub-sampling however: be-
low we derive an accuracy theorem for PRSMA when instantiated with our oracle-efficient RSPM
algorithm.
Theorem 9. Let Q a class of statistical queries with a separator set of size m. Let AO∗ denote the RSPM
algorithm with access to O∗, a perfect weighted optimization oracle for Q. Then PRSMA instantiated
with AO∗ , run on a dataset S of size n, with input parameters ǫ and δ is an (α,β)-minimizer for any
β > δ and
α ≤ O˜

m2 log
(
m
β−δ
)
log(1/δ) +
√
log(1/δ) log
( |Q|
β−δ
)
√
nǫ
 ,
where the O˜ hides logarithmic factors in 1ǫ , log(
1
δ ).
Proof. With probability at least 1− δ, PRSMA outputs the result of RSPM run on an n/K fraction
of the dataset, with privacy parameter ǫ′ = 1√
8 nK log(2K/δ)
. We will condition on this event for the
remainder of the proof, which occurs except with probability δ.
Let q∗ denote the true minimizer on S . Let SK denote the random subsample, and let qK denote
the true minimizer on SK . By Theorem 5, we know that for any η > 0, with probability 1− η, the
error on SK is bounded as follows:
qˆ(SK )− qK (SK ) ≤
2m2 log(m/η)
ǫ′ nK
We next bound maxq∈Q q(SK )− q(S), the maximum difference between the value that any query
takes on SK compared to the value that it takes on S . By a Chernoff bound for subsampled random
variables (see e.g. Theorem 1.2 of [BM13]), for any q ∈ Q, t > 0,
Pr[q(SK )− q(S) ≥ t] ≤ exp
(
−2 n
K
t2
)
.
By a union bound over Q, this means that with probability 1− η,
max
q∈Q
q(SK )− q(S) ≤
√
K
2n
log
(
2|Q|
η
)
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We now have all the ingredients to complete the bound:
qˆ(S)− q∗(S) = [qˆ(S)− qˆ(SK )] + [qˆ(SK )− q∗(SK )] + [q∗(SK )− q∗(S)]
≤ 2max
q∈Q
|q(SK )− q(S)|+ qˆ(SK )− q∗(SK )
= 2max
q∈Q
|q(SK )− q(S)|+ qˆ(SK )− qK (SK ) + qK (SK )− q∗(SK )
≤ 2max
q∈Q
|q(SK )− q(S)|+ qˆ(SK )− qK (SK ).
By a union bound and the results above, we know that the righthand side is less than
2
√
K
2n
log(
2|Q|
η
) +
2m2 log(m/η)
ǫ′ nK
,
with probability at least 1−η. Substituting η = β−δ, ǫ′ = 1√
8 nK log(2K/δ)
, K =O(1ǫ (1+log(2/δ))) gives
the desired result.
We remark that we can convert this (α,β)-accuracy bound into a bound on the expected error
using the same technique we used to compute the expected error of RSPM. The expected error of
PRSMA with the above inputs is O˜(
2m2(logm+1)√
nǫ
+
√
(log |Q|+1)√
nǫ
).
4 OracleQuery: Oracle-Efficient Private Synthetic Data Generation
We now apply the oracle-efficient optimization methods we have developed to the problem of
generating private synthetic data. In particular, given a private dataset S and a query class Q, we
would like to compute a synthetic dataset Sˆ subject to differential privacy such that the error
maxq∈Q |q(Sˆ) − q(S)| is bounded by some target parameter α. We provide a general algorithmic
framework called OracleQuery for designing oracle-efficient algorithms. The crucial property of
the query class we rely on to obtain oracle efficiency is dual separability, which requires both the
query class and its dual class have separator sets (Definition 2). Informally, the dual of a query
class Q is the query class Qdual that results from swapping the role of the functions q ∈ Q and the
data elements x ∈ X . More formally:
Definition 10 (Dual class and dual separability). Fix a class of queries Q. For every element x in
X , let hx : Q → {0,1} be defined such that hx(q) = q(x). The dual class Qdual of Q is the set of all such
functions defined by elements in X :
Qdual = {hx | x ∈ X }.
We say that the class Q is (m1,m2)-dually separable if there exists a separator set of size m1 for Q, and
there exists a separator set of size m2 for Qdual.
As we will show (see Appendix A), many widely studied query classes, including discrete
halfspaces, conjunctions, disjunctions, and parities are dually separable, often with m1 = m2 = d
(in fact, many of these classes are self-dual, meaning Q = Qdual). For any q ∈ Q, define its negation
¬q to be ¬q(x) = 1 − q(x). Let ¬Q = {¬q | q ∈ Q} be the negation of Q. It will simplify several
aspects of our exposition to deal with classes that are closed under negation. For any class Q,
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define Q = Q∪¬Q to be the closure of Q under negation. Note that whenever we have a weighted
minimization oracle for Q, we have one for ¬Q as well — simply by negating the weights. Further,
if U is a separator set for Q, it is also a separator set for ¬Q. This implies that we also have oracle
efficient learners for Q, since we can separately learn over Q and ¬Q, and then privately take the
minimum value query that results from the two procedures (using e.g. report-noisy-min [DR14]).
Before we give our algorithm and analysis, we state several consequences of our main theorem
(that follow from instantiating it with different oracle-efficient learners).
Theorem 10. Let Q be an (m1,m2)-dually separable query class. Then given access to a weighted
minimization oracle O over the class Qdual and a differentially private weighted minimization algo-
rithm Oǫ0,δ0 for the class Q (with appropriately chosen privacy parameters ǫ0 and δ0), the algorithm
OracleQuery is oracle-efficient, (ǫ,δ)-differentially private, and (α,β)-accurate with α depending on
the instantiation of Oǫ0,δ0 . If Oǫ0,δ0 is robustly differentially private, then so is OracleQuery.
1. If Oǫ0,δ0 is instantiated with the Gaussian RSPM algorithm, then
α ≤ O˜
m3/21 m3/42
√
log(m1/β) log |X | log(1/δ)
nǫ

1/2
In this case, OracleQuery is oracle equivalent to a differentially private algorithm, but is not
robustly differentially private.
2. If Oǫ0,δ0 is instantiated with the PRSMA algorithm (using the Laplace RSPM as AO∗), then
α ≤ O˜
 (m4/31 + log1/3(|Q|))m1/42 log1/6(|X |)(nε)1/3
 ·polylog
(
1
β − δ
)
as long as β > δ. In this case, OracleQuery is robustly differentially private.
3. If Oǫ0,δ0 is an (α0,β0)-accurate differentially private oracle with α0 =O (log(|Q|/(ǫ0n))), then
α ≤ O˜
m3/42
√
log |X | log(1/δ) log(|Q|/β)
nǫ

1/2
In this case, OracleQuery is robustly differentially private.
where the O˜ hides logarithmic factors in 1δ ,
1
β ,m1,m2,n and log(|X |).
A couple of remarks are in order.
Remark 2. The first two bounds quoted in Theorem 10 result from plugging in constructions of oracle-
efficient differentially private learners that we gave in Section 3. These constructions start with a
non-private optimization oracle. The third bound quoted in Theorem 10 assumes the existence of a
differentially private oracle with error bounds comparable to the (inefficient) exponential mechanism
based learner of [KLN+11]. We don’t know if such oracles can be constructed from non-private (exact)
optimization oracles. But this bound is analgous to the bounds given in the non-private oracle-efficient
learning literature. This literature gives constructions assuming the existence of perfect learning oracles,
but in practice, these oracles are instantiated with heuristics like regression or support vector machines,
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which exactly optimize some convex surrogate loss function. This is often reasonable, because although
these heuristics don’t have strong worst-case guarantees, they often perform very well in practice. The
same exercise makes sense for private problems: we can use a differentially private convex minimization
algorithm to optimize a surrogate loss function (e.g. [CMS11, BST14]), and hope that it does a good
job minimizing classification error in practice. It no longer makes sense to assume that the heuristic
exactly solves the learning problem (since this is impossible subject to differential privacy) — instead,
the analogous assumption is that it does as well as the best inefficient private learner.
Remark 3. It is useful to compare the bounds we obtain to the best bounds that can be obtained with
inefficient algorithms. To be concrete, consider the class of boolean conjunctions defined over the boolean
hypercube X = {0,1}d (see Appendix A), which are dually-separable with m1 = m2 = d. The best (in-
efficient) bounds for constructing synthetic data useful for conjunctions [HR10, GRU12] obtain error:
α = O
(√
log |Q|(log |X |)1/4√
ǫn
)
. In the case of boolean conjunctions, log |X | = log |Q| = d, and so this bound
becomes: α = O
(
d3/4√
ǫn
)
. In contrast, the three oracle efficient bounds given in Theorem 10, when instan-
tiated for boolean conjunctions are:
1. α =O
(
d11/8√
ǫn
)
,
2. α =O
(
d7/4
(ǫn)1/3
)
, and
3. α =O
(
d9/8√
ǫn
)
respectively. Therefore the costs in terms of error that we pay, in exchange for oracle efficiency are d5/8,
d
(ǫn)1/6
, and d3/8 respectively.
We now give a brief overview of our construction before diving into the technical details.
Proof overview: We present our solution in three main steps.
1. We first revisit the formulation by [HRU13] that views the synthetic data generation problem
as a zero-sum game between a Data player and a Query player. We leverage the fact that at
any approximate equilibrium, the data player’s mixed strategy (over X ) represents a good
synthetic dataset S ′ with respect to Q.
2. Using the seminal result of [FS96], we will compute the equilibrium for the zero-sum game
by simulating no-regret dynamics between the two players: in rounds, the Data player plays
according to an oracle-efficient online learning algorithm due to [SKS16], and the Query
player best responds to the Data player by using a differentially private oracle efficient op-
timization algorithm. At the end of the dynamics, the average play of the Data player is an
approximate minimax strategy for the game, and hence a good synthetic dataset.
3. We instantiate the private best response procedure of theQuery player using different oracle-
efficient methods, which we have derived in this paper, each of which gives different accu-
racy guarantees. Finally, we apply our result to several query classes of interest.
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4.1 The Query Release Game
The query release game defined in [HRU13] involves a Data player and Query player. The data
player has action set equal to the data universe X (or equivalently the dual class Qdual), while the
query player has action set equal to the query class Q. Given a pair of actions x ∈ X and q ∈ Q, the
payoff is defined to be:
A(x,q) = q(S)− q(x),
where S is the input private dataset. In the zero-sum game, the Data player will try minimize the
payoff and the Query player will try to maximize the payoff. To play the game, each player chooses
a mixed strategy, which is defined by a probability distribution over their action set. Let ∆(X ) and
∆(Q) denote the sets of mixed strategies of the Data player and Query player respectively. To
simplify notation, we will write A(Sˆ , ·) = Ex∼Sˆ [A(x, ·)] and A(·,W ) = Eq∼W [A(·,q)] for any Sˆ ∈ ∆(X )
andW ∈ ∆(Q). By von Neumann’s minimax theorem, there exists a value V such that
V = min
Sˆ∈∆(X )
max
q∈Q
A(Sˆ ,W ) = max
W∈∆(Q)
min
x∈X
A(x,W )
If both players are playing strategies that can guarantee a payoff value close to V , then we say
that the pair of strategies form an approximate equilibrium.
Definition 11 (Approximate Equilibrium). For any α > 0, a pair of strategies Sˆ ∈ ∆(X ) andW ∈ ∆(Q)
form an α-approximate minimax equilibrium if
max
q∈Q
A(Sˆ ,q) ≤ V +α and min
x∈X
A(W,x) ≥ V −α.
Hsu et al. [HRU13] show that the query release game has value V = 0 and that at any approxi-
mate equilibrium, the mixed strategy of the Data player provides accurate answers for all queries
in Q.
Lemma 10 (Accuracy at equilibrium [HRU13]). Let (Sˆ ,W ) be an α-approximate equilibrium of the
query release game. Then for any q ∈ Q, |q(S)− q(Sˆ)| ≤ α.
Therefore, the dataset represented by the distribution Sˆ (or that could be obtained by sampling
from Sˆ) is exactly the synthetic dataset we would like to compute, and hence the problem of
privately computing synthetic data is reduced to the problem of differentially private equilibrium
computation in the query release game.
4.2 Solving the Game with No-Regret Dynamics
To privately compute an approximate equilibrium of the game, we will simulate the following
no-regret dynamics between the Data Player and the Query Player in rounds: In each round t, the
Data player plays a distribution S t according to a no-regret learning algorithm, and the Query
player plays an approximate best-response to S t . The following classical theorem of Freund and
Schapire [FS96] (instantiated in our setting) shows that the average play of both players in this
dynamic forms an approximate equilibrium.
Theorem 11 ([FS96]). Let S1,S2, . . . ,ST ∈ ∆(X ) be a sequence of distributions played by the Data
Player, and let q1,q2, . . . ,qT ∈ Q be the Query player’s sequence of approximate best-responses against
25
these distributions. Suppose that the regret of the two players satisfy:
RegD(T ) =
T∑
t=1
A(S t ,qt)−min
x∈X
T∑
t=1
A(x,qt) ≤ γDT
RegQ(T ) = max
q∈Q
T∑
t=1
A(S t ,q)−
T∑
t=1
A(S t ,qt) ≤ γQT .
Let S be uniform mixture of the distributions {S1, . . . ,ST } and W be the uniform distribution over
{q1, . . . ,qT }. Then (S,W ) is a (γD +γQ)-approximate minimax equilibrium of the game.
Now we will detail the no-regret algorithm for the Data player and the best-response method
for the Query player, and provide the regret bounds γD and γQ.
No-Regret Algorithm for the Data Player. We start with the observation that the regret of the
Data player is independent of the private data S , because
RegD(T ) =
T∑
t=1
(
qt(S)− qt(S t)
)
−min
x∈X
T∑
t=1
(
qt(S)− qt(x)
)
=
T∑
t=1
¬qt(S t)−min
x∈X
T∑
t=1
¬qt(x).
Therefore, it suffices to minimize regret with respect to the sequence of loss functions {¬qt(·)},
while ignoring the private dataset S . We crucially rely on the fact that each qt is computed by
the Query player subject to differential privacy, and so the Data player’s learning algorithm need
not be differentially private: differential privacy for the overall procedure will follow from the
post-processing guarantee of differential privacy. In particular, we will run an oracle-efficient al-
gorithm Context-FTPL due to [SKS16], which is a variant of the “Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader”
of [KV05] algorithm that performs perturbations using a separator set. We state its regret guaran-
tee below. Because Context-FTPL need not be differentially private, it can be instantiated with an
arbitrary heuristic oracle, that need not be either differentially private or certifiable.
Context-FTPL (Qdual,µ) Algorithm [SKS16]
Given: parameter µ, hypothesis class Qdual (or equivalently X ), separator set U ⊂ Q for Qdual,
weighted optimization oracle O for Qdual
Input: A sequence of queries {q1, . . . ,qT } selected by the Query player.
1: for t = 1 . . .T do
2: Data player plays the distribution S t such that each draw x generated as follows:
3: Draw a sequence (s,ηs), for s ∈U , where ηs ∼ Lap(µ)
4: Let x = argminx∈X
∑t−1
τ=1 hx(¬qτ) +
∑
s∈S ηshx(s) {Use non-private oracle O}
5: end for
Theorem 12 (Follows from [SKS16]). Suppose that U is a separator set for Qdual of cardinality m2.
Then the Data player running Context-FTPL (X ,µ) with appropriately chosen µ has regret:
RegD(T ) ≤O(m3/42
√
T log |X |)
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Note that the algorithm Context-FTPL only provides sample access to each distribution S t , but
each draw from S t can be computed using a single call to the oracle O.
ApproximateBest Response by theQuery Player. At each round t, after the Data player chooses
S t , the Query player needs to approximately solve the following best-response problem:
argmax
q∈Q
A(S t ,q) = argmax
q∈Q
(
q(S)− q(S t)
)
Unlike the problem faced by the Data player, this optimization problem directly depends on the
private data S , so the best response needs to be computed privately. Since we only have sample
access to the distribution S t , the Query player will first drawN random examples from the distri-
bution S t , and we will the empirical distribution Sˆ t over the sample as a proxy for S t . Recall that
Q = Q⋃¬Q, so we will first approximately and differentially privately solve both of the following
two problems separately:
argmax
q∈Q
(
q(S)− q(Sˆ t)
)
and argmax
q∈ ¬Q
(
q(S)− q(Sˆ t)
)
(6)
Note that the two problems are equivalent to the following problems respectively:
argmin
q∈Q
(
q(Sˆ t)− q(S)
)
and argmin
q∈Q
(
q(S)− q(Sˆ t)
)
, (7)
both of which are weighted optimization problems:
argmin
q∈Q
1
n
∑
xi∈S
wiq(xi) +
1
N
∑
x′j∈Sˆ t
w′jq(x
′
j ) (8)
with weights wi ,w
′
j taking values in {1,−1}. We will rely on a private weighted optimization algo-
rithm Oǫ0,δ0 to compute two solutions qt1 and qt2 for the two problems in Equation (7) respectively.
Finally, the Query player privately selects one of the queries using report noisy max—i.e. it first
perturb the values of A(Sˆ t ,qt1) and A(Sˆ
t ,qt2) with Laplace noise, and then select the query with
higher noisy value. By bounding the errors from the sampling of Sˆ t , the private optimization
oracle Oǫ0,δ0 , and report noisy max, we can derive the following regret guarantee for the Query
player.
Lemma 11. Suppose that the oracle Oǫ0,δ0 succeeds in solving all problems it is presented with up to
error at most α0 except with probability β0. Then with probability at least 1− 3β0T , the Query player
has regret:
RegQ(T ) ≤ T O
(
α0 +
log(1/β0)
nǫ0
)
.
Proof. There are three potential sources of error at each round t. The first is the error introduced
by solving our optimization problem over the proxy distribution Sˆ t instead of S t . By applying a
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Private Best-Response (PBR)
Given: privacy parameters (ǫ0,δ0), accuracy parameters (α0,β0), a private weighted optimization
algorithm Oǫ0,δ0 .
Input: A private dataset S and the Data player’s sequence of distributions
{S1, . . . ,ST }.
1: for t = 1 . . .T do
2: Query player plays a query qt as follows:
3: Draw N samples x′1, . . . x
′
N ∼i.i.d. S t with N = 2log(2|Q|/β0)α20
4: Form the weighted datasetWD1 = {(xi , 1n )}xi∈S ∪ {xj , −1N }j=1...N
5: Form the weighted datasetWD2 = {(xi , −1n )}xi∈S ∪ {xj , 1N }j=1...N
6: Let qt1 =Oǫ0,δ0(WD1) and qt2 = ¬
(
Oǫ0,δ0(WD2)
)
7: Perturb payoffs: A˜1 = A(Sˆ
t ,qt1) + Lap(1/(ǫ0n)) and A˜2 = A(Sˆ
t ,qt2) + Lap(1/(ǫ0n))
8: If A˜1 > A˜2 then q
t = qt1 else q
t = qt2
9: end for
Chernoff bound and a union bound over all queries in Q, we have with probability 1− β0 that,
for all q ∈ Q,
∣∣∣q(S t)− q(Sˆ t)∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log(2|Q|/β0)
N
≤ α0. (9)
Next is the error introduced by the oracle. By our assumption on the oracle Oǫ0,δ0 , we have except
with probability 2β0 that(
qt1(S)− qt1(Sˆ t)
)
≥max
q∈Q
(
q(S)− q(Sˆ t)
)
−α0 and
(
qt2(S)− qt2(Sˆ t)
)
≥ max
q∈ ¬Q
(
q(S)− q(Sˆ t)
)
−α0
The two inequalities together imply that
max
q∈{qt1,qt2}
(
q(S)− q(Sˆ t)
)
≥ max
q∈ ¬Q
(
q(S)− q(Sˆ t)
)
−α0 (10)
Finally, the Laplace noise used to privately select the best query amongst qt1 and q
t
2 introduces
additional error. But by the accuracy guarantee of report noisy max [DR14] (which follows from
the CDF of the Laplace distribution and a union bound over two samples from it) we know that
with probability 1− β0,
(
qt(S)− qt(Sˆ t)
)
≥ max
q∈{qt1,qt2}
(
q(S)− q(Sˆ t)
)
− 2log(2/β0)
nǫ0
(11)
Combining Equations (9) to (11) and applying a union bound, we have the following per-round
guarantee: except with probability 3β0,
(
qt(S)− qt(S t)
)
≥max
q∈Q
(
q(S)− q(S t)
)
−O
(
α0 +
log(1/β0)
nǫ0
)
.
Finally, taking a union bound over all T steps recovers the stated regret bound.
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4.3 The Full Algorithm: OracleQuery
Our main algorithm OracleQuery first simulates the no-regret dynamics described above, and
then constructs a synthetic dataset from the average distribution S = 1T
∑
t∈[T ]S t played by the
Data player. Since we only have sampling access to each S t , we will approximate S by the empir-
ical distribution of a set of independent samples drawn from S . As we show below, the sampling
error will be on the same order as the regret as long as we take roughly log |Q|/α2 samples.
Lemma 12. Suppose that S is an η-approximate minimax strategy for the query release game. Let
{x′1, . . . ,x′N } be a set of N = 2log(2|Q|/β)α20 samples drawn i.i.d. from S , and Sˆ be the empirical distributions
over the drawn samples. Then with probability 1− β, Sˆ is an (η +α0)-approximate minimax strategy.
Proof. By the definition of an η-approximate minimax strategy, we have
max
q∈Q
A(S,q) ≤ V + η = η.
By applying the Chernoff bound, we know that except with probability β/ |Q|, the following holds
for each q ∈ Q: ∣∣∣A(S,q)−A(Sˆ ,q)∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log(2|Q|/β)
N
= α
Note that this implies
∣∣∣A(S,¬q)−A(Sˆ ,¬q)∣∣∣ ≤ α as well. Then by taking a union bound over Q, we
know that
∣∣∣A(S,q)−A(Sˆ ,q)∣∣∣ ≤ α holds for all q ∈ Q with probability at least 1− β. It follows that
max
q∈Q
A(Sˆ ,q) ≤max
q∈Q
A(S,q) +α0 ≤ η +α0,
which recovers the stated bound.
The details of the algorithm are presented in Algorithm 1. To analyze the algorithm, we will
start with establishing its privacy guarantee, which directly follows from the advanced composi-
tion of [DRV10], the fact that each call to PBR by the Query player satisfies (3ε0,2δ0)-differential
privacy (with ǫ0 and δ0 set according to Algorithm 1), and the fact that the rest of the algorithm
can be viewed as a post-processing of these calls.
Lemma 13 (Privacy of OracleQuery). OracleQuery is oracle equivalent to an (ǫ,δ)-differentially pri-
vate algorithm. If Oǫ0,δ0 is robustly differentially private, then OracleQuery is (ǫ,δ)-robustly differen-
tially private.
Now to analyze the accuracy of OracleQuery, we will show that the average distribution S is
part of an approximate minimax equilibrium, and so is its approximation Sˆ .
Lemma 14 (Accuracy of OracleQuery). Suppose thatOǫ0,δ0 is a weighted (ǫ0,δ0)-differentially private
(α0,β0) minimization oracle over the class Q, where the parameters ǫ0, δ0, and β0 are set according to
Algorithm 1. Then OracleQuery is an (α,β)-accurate synthetic data generation algorithm for Q with
α ≤O
α0 +m3/42
√
log(|X |)
T
+
log(1/β0)
nǫ0

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Algorithm 1 Oracle-Efficient Synthetic Data Release: OracleQuery
Given: Target privacy parameters ε,δ ∈ (0,1), a target failure probability β, a number of rounds
T , accuracy parameters α0,β0, a weighted optimization oracle O for the class Qdual, a (ǫ0,δ0)-
differentially private (α0,β0)-accurate minimization oracle Oǫ0,δ0 for class Q with parameters that
satisfy
ǫ0 =
ε√
24T ln(2/δ)
, δ0 ≤
δ
4T
, β0 =
β
4T
Input: A dataset S ∈ X n.
1: Initialize q0 ∈ Q to be an arbitrary query
2: Let Nα0 =
2log(8|Q|/β)
α20
3: for t = 1 . . .T do
4: Let S t be a distribution defined by the sampling algorithm
Context-FTPL (Qdual,O, {q0, . . . ,q(t−1)}) {Data player’s no-regret algorithm}
5: Let qt = PBR(ε0,δ0,α0,β0,S,Oǫ0 ,δ0 ,S t) {Query player’s best response}
6: end for
7: for j = 1, . . . ,Nα0 : do
8: Draw τ from Unif([T ]) and then draw x′j from distribution S
τ
9: end for
Output: the dataset Sˆ = {x′1, . . . ,x′Nα0 }
Proof. First, we will show that the average distribution S from the no-regret dynamics is an η-
approximate minimax strategy, with
η ≤O
α0 +m3/42
√
log(|X |)
T
+
log(1/β0)
nǫ0
 .
Recall that the average regret for the two players is bounded by
RegD(T )/T ≤O(m3/42
√
log |X |/T ) and, RegQ(T )/T ≤O
(
α0 +
log(1/β0)
nǫ0
)
,
with probability at least 1 − 3Tβ0. Then by Theorem 11, we know that S is an η-approximate
minimax strategy, with probability at least 1− 3β/4. Let us condition on this event. Lastly, by the
setting of Nα0 in Algorithm 1 and Lemma 12, we know that Sˆ is a (η +α0), except with probability
β/4. Then the stated bound follows directly from a union bound.
Finally, wewill consider three different instantiations ofOǫ0,δ0 . To optimize the error guarantee
for each instantiation, we set the number of rounds T used in Algorithm 1 so that the regret of the
Data player given by Theorem 12 is on the same order as the error of Oǫ0,δ0 . We first consider a
differentially private oracle that matches the error guarantees of the generic private learner from
[KLN+11].
Corollary 1. Suppose thatOǫ0,0 is an (ǫ0,0)-differentially private (α0,β0)-accurate weighted minimiza-
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tion oracle, where α0,β0 are such that α0 ≤O
(
log(|Q|/β0)
nǫ0
)
. ThenOracleQuerywith T =
⌈
nǫm3/42
√
log(|X |)
log(|Q|/β)
√
log(1/δ)
⌉
is an (α,β)-accurate synthetic data generation algorithm for Q with
α ≤ O˜
m3/42
√
log |X | log(1/δ) log(|Q|/β)
nǫ

1/2
where the O˜ hides logarithmic factors in m2,n and log(|X |).
Next, we will instantiate Oǫ0,δ0 with the RSPM algorithm. Note that with this choice, although
OracleQuery is oracle equivalent to a differentially private algorithm, it is not robustly differen-
tially private.
Corollary 2. When Oǫ0,δ0 is instantiated with the Gaussian RSPM algorithm, OracleQuery with T =⌈
m3/42
√
log(|X |)nǫ
m3/21
√
log(m1/β) ln(1/δ)
⌉
is an (α,β)-accurate synthetic data generation algorithm for Q with
α ≤ O˜
m3/21 m3/42
√
log(m1/β) log |X | log(1/δ)
nǫ

1/2
where the O˜ hides logarithmic factors in m2,n and log(|X |).
Finally, we instantiate the oracleOǫ0,δ0 with the PRSMA algorithm that uses the Laplace RSPM
algorithm with a certifiable heuristic oracle.
Corollary 3. When Oǫ0,δ0 is instantiated with PRSMA algorithm (that internally uses Laplace RSPM
as AO∗), then for any β > δ, OracleQuery with T =

(
m3/42
√
log(|X |)nǫ
m21+
√
log(|Q|)
)4/3 is an (α,β)-accurate synthetic
data generation algorithm for Q with
α ≤O
m
1/4
2 log
1/6 |X |
(
m4/31 + log
1/3(|Q|)
)
(nε)1/3
polylog
(
m11/δ,1/ǫ,
1
β − δ
)
.
4.4 Example: Conjunctions
Here, we instantiate our bounds for a particular query class of interest: boolean conjunctions over
the hypercube {0,1}d . Constructing synthetic data for conjunctions (or equivalently producing a
full marginal table for a dataset) has long been a challenge problem in differential privacy, subject
to a long line of work [BCD+07, UV10, GHRU13, KRSU10, TUV12, HRS12, FK14, CTUW14], and
is known to be computationally hard even for the special case of two-way conjunctions [UV10].
Our results in particular imply the first oracle efficient algorithm for generating synthetic data for
all 2d conjunctions. Other interesting classes satisfy all of the conditions needed for our synthetic
data generation algorithm to apply, including disjunctions, parities, and discrete halfspaces— see
Appendix A for details, and for how to allow negated variables in the class of conjunctions while
preserving seperability.
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Definition 12. Given a subset of variables S ⊆ [d], the boolean conjunction defined by S is the statistical
query qS (x) = ∧j∈Sxj . The set of boolean conjunctions QC defined over the hypercube X = {0,1}d is:
QC = {qS | S ⊆ [d]}
Boolean conjunctions are (d,d) dually-separable (see Appendix A for the separator set).
Thus, we can instantiate Theorem 10 with (e.g.) the Gaussian RSPM algorithm, and obtain
an oracle-efficient algorithm for generating synthetic data for all 2d conjunctions that outputs a
synthetic dataset S ′ that satisfies:
max
q∈QC
|q(S)− q(S ′)| ≤ O˜
(
d11/8√
ǫn
)
5 A Barrier
In this paper, we give oracle-efficient private algorithms for learning and synthetic data generation
for classes of queries Q that exhibit special structure: small universal identification sets. Because
of information theoretic lower bounds for differentially private learning [BNSV15, ALMM18], we
know that these results cannot be extended to all learnable classes of queries Q. But can they be
extended to all classes of queries that are information theoretically learnable subject to differential
privacy? Maybe— this is themost interesting question left open by our work. But here, we present
a “barrier” illustrating a difficulty that one would have to overcome in trying to prove this result.
Our argument has three parts:
1. First, we observe a folklore connection between differentially private learning and online
learning: any differentially private empirical risk minimization algorithm A for a class Q
that always outputs the exact minimizer of a data-independent perturbation of the empirical risks
can also be used as a no-regret learning algorithm, using the “follow the perturbed leader”
analysis of Kalai and Vempala [KV05]. The per-round run-time of this algorithm is exactly
equal to the run-time of A.
2. Oracle-efficient no-regret learning algorithms are subject to a lower bound of Hazan and
Koren [HK16], that states that even given access to an oracle which solves optimization
problems over a set of experts Q in unit time, there exist finite classes Q such that obtaining
non-trivial regret guarantees requires total running time larger than poly(|Q|). This implies
a lower bound on the magnitude of the perturbations that an algorithm of the type described
in (1) must use.
3. Finally, we observe for any finite class of hypotheses Q, information theoretically, it is pos-
sible to solve the empirical risk minimization problem on a dataset of size T up to error
O(
log |Q|
ǫT ) using the generic learner from [KLN
+11]. This implies a separation between the
kinds of algorithms described in 1), and the (non-efficiently) achievable information theo-
retic bounds consistent with differential privacy.
We emphasize that oracle efficient algorithms for learning over Q have access to a non-private
oracle which exactly solves the learning problem over Q— not an NP oracle, for which the situa-
tion is different (see the discussion in Section 6).
First we define the class of mechanisms our barrier result applies to:
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Definition 13. We say that an (ǫ,δ)-differentially private learning algorithm A : X n → Q for Q is a
perturbed Empirical Risk Minimizer (pERM) if there is some distribution Dǫ,δ (defined independently
of the data S) over perturbations Z ∈ R|Q| such that on input S ∈ X n, A outputs:
A(S) = argmin
q∈Q
(
n · q(S) +Zq
)
where Z ∼ Dǫ,δ.
We note that many algorithms are pERM algorithms. The most obvious example is report-
noisy-min, in which each Zq ∼ Lap(1/ǫ) independently. The exponential mechanism instantiated
with empirical loss as its quality score (i.e. the generic learner of [KLN+11]) is also a pERM al-
gorithm, in which each Zq is drawn independently from a Gumbel distribution [DR14]. But note
that the coordinates Zq need not be drawn independently: The oracle-efficient RSPM algorithm
we give in Section 3 is also a pERM algorithm, in which the perturbations Zq are introduced in an
implicit (correlated) way by perturbing the dataset itself. And it is natural to imagine that many
algorithms that employ weighted optimization oracles — which after all solve an exact minimiza-
tion problem — will fall into this class. The expected error guarantees of these algorithms are
proven by bounding E[||Z ||∞], which is typically a tight bound.
We now briefly recall the online learning setting. Let Q be an arbitrary class of functions
q : X → [0,1]. In rounds t = 1, . . . ,T , the learner selects a function qt ∈ Q, and an (adaptive)
adversary selects an example xt ∈ X , as a function of the sequence (q1,x1, . . . ,qt−1,xt−1). The learner
incurs a loss of ℓt = qt(xt). A standard objective is to minimize the expected average regret:
R(T ) = E
 1T
T∑
t=1
qt(xt)
−minq∈Q 1T
T∑
t=1
q(xt)
where the expectation is taken over the randomness of the learner. A weighted optimization oracle
in the online learning setting is exactly the same thing as it is in our setting: Given a weighted
dataset (S,w), it returns argminq∈Q
∑
xi∈S wi · q(xi).
A natural way to try to use a private learning algorithm in the online learning setting is just
to run it at each round t on the dataset defined on the set of data points observed so far: St =
{x1, . . . ,xt−1}.
Definition 14. Follow the Private Leader, instantiated with A, is the online learning algorithm that at
every round t selects qt =A(St).
The follow the private leader algorithm instantiated with A has a controllable regret bound
whenever A is a differentially private pERM algorithm. The following theorem is folklore, but
follows essentially from the original analysis of “follow the perturbed leader” by Kalai and Vem-
pala [KV05]. See e.g. the lecture notes from [RS17] or [ALMT17] for an example of this analysis
cast in the language of differential privacy. We include a proof in Appendix D for completeness.
Theorem 13. Let ε,δ ∈ (0,1) and let A be an (ǫ,δ) differentially private pERM algorithm for query
class Q, with perturbation distribution D(ε,δ). Then Follow the Private Leader instantiated with A has
expected regret bounded by:
R(T ) ≤O
(
ǫ+ δ +
EZ∼Dε,δ [‖Z‖∞]
T
)
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Note that the regret is controlled by EZ∼Dε,δ [‖Z‖∞], which also controls the error of A as a
learning algorithm.
We wish to exploit a lower bound on the running time of oracle efficient online learners over
arbitrary sets Q due to Hazan and Koren [HK16]:
Theorem 14 ([HK16]). For every algorithm with access to a weighted optimization oracleO, there exists
a class of functions Q such that the algorithm cannot guarantee that its expected average regret will be
smaller than 1/16 in total time less than O
(√|Q|/ log3(|Q|)).
Here, it is assumed that calls to the oracle O can be carried out in unit time, and total time
refers to the cumulative time over all T rounds of interaction. Hence, ifA is oracle-efficient— i.e.
it runs in time f (t) = poly(t, log |Q|) when given as input a dataset of size t, the total run time of
follow the private leader instantiated with A is: ∑Tt=1 f (t) ≤ T · f (T ) = poly(T , log |Q|).
This theorem is almost what we want — except that the order of quantifiers is reversed. It in
principle leaves open the possibility that for every class Q, there is a different oracle efficient algo-
rithm (tailored to the class) that can efficiently obtain low regret. After all, our RSPM algorithm
is non-uniform in this way — for each new class of functions Q, it must be instantiated with a
separator set for that class.
Via a min-max argument together with an equilibrium sparsification technique, we can give a
version of the lower bound of [HK16] that has the order of quantifiers we want — see Appendix
D for the proof.
Theorem 15. For any d, there is a fixed finite class of statistical queries Q of size |Q| = N = 2d defined
over a data universe of size |X | =O(N5 log2N ) such that for every online learning algorithm with access
to a weighted optimization oracle for Q, it cannot guarantee that its expected average regret will be o(1)
in total time less than Ω(
√
N/ log3(N )).
Theorem 15 therefore implies that follow the private leader, when instantiatedwith any oracle-
efficient differentially private pERM algorithm A cannot obtain diminishing regret R(T ) = o(1)
unless the number of rounds T = Ω(|Q|c) for some c > 0. In combination with Theorem 13, this
implies our barrier result:
Theorem 16. Any oracle efficient (i.e. running in time poly(n, log |Q|)) (ǫ,δ)-differentially private
pERM algorithm instantiated with a weighted optimization oracle for the query class Q defined in The-
orem 15, with perturbation distribution D(ε,δ) must be such that for every (ǫ + δ) = o(1):
EZ∼D(ε,δ)[||Z ||∞] ≥Ω(|Q|c)
for some constant c > 0.
If the accuracy guarantee of A is proportional to EZ∼D(ε,δ)[||Z ||∞] (as it is for all pERM algo-
rithms that we know of), this means that there exist finite classes of statistical queries Q such that
no oracle-efficient algorithm can obtain non-trivial error unless the dataset size n ≥ poly(|Q|). Of
course, if n ≥ poly(|Q|), then algorithms such as report-noisy-min and the exponential mechanism
can be run in polynomial time.
This is in contrast with what we can obtain via the generic (inefficient) private learner of
[KLN+11], which obtains expected error O
(
log |Q|
ǫn
)
, which is non-trivial whenever n = Ω
(
log |Q|
ǫ
)
.
Similarly, because we show in Theorem 15 that the hard class Q can be taken to have universe size
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X = poly(Q), this means that information theoretically, it is even possible to privately solve the
(harder) problem of α-accurate synthetic data for Q for α = O
((
log2 |Q|
ǫn
)1/3)
using the (inefficient)
synthetic data generation algorithm of [BLR13]. This is non-trivial whenever n = Ω
(
log2 |Q|
ǫ
)
. In
contrast, our barrier result states is that if there exists an oracle-efficient learner A for this class
Q that has polynomially related sample complexity to what is obtainable absent a guarantee of
oracle efficiency, then A must either:
1. Not be a pERM algorithm, or:
2. Have expected error that is O
(
poly(logEZ∼D(ε,δ) [||Z ||∞])
n
)
.
Condition 2. seems especially implausible, as for every pERM we are aware of, EZ∼D(ε,δ)[||Z ||∞]
is a tight bound (up to log factors) on its expected error. In particular, this barrier implies that
there is no oracle efficient algorithm for sampling from the exponential mechanism distribution
used in the generic learner of [KLN+11] for arbitrary query classes Q.
6 Conclusion and Open Questions
In this paper, we have initiated the systematic study of the power of oracle-efficient differentially
private algorithms, and have made the distinction between oracle-dependent non-robust differ-
ential privacy and robust differential privacy. This is a new direction that suggests a number of
fascinating open questions. In our opinion, the most interesting of these is:
‘‘Can every learning and synthetic data generation problem that is solvable subject to
differential privacy be solved with an oracle-efficient (robustly) differentially private
algorithm, with only a polynomial blow-up in sample complexity?”
It remains an open question whether or not finite Littlestone dimension characterizes private
learnability (it is known that infinite Littlestone dimension precludes private learnability [ALMM18])
— and so one avenue towards resolving both open questions in the affirmative simultaneously
would be to show that finite Littlestone dimension can be leveraged to obtain oracle-efficient dif-
ferentially private learning algorithms.
However, because of our barrier result, we conjecture that the set of query classes that are
privately learnable in an oracle-efficient manner is a strict subset of the set that are privately learn-
able. If this is so, can we precisely characterize this set? What is the right structural property, and
is it more general than the sufficient condition of having small universal identification sets that
we have discovered?
Even restricting attention to query classes with universal identification sets of size m, there
are interesting quantitative questions. The Gaussian version of our RSPM algorithm efficiently
obtains error that scales asm3/2, but information-theoretically, it is possible to obtain error scaling
only linearly with m. Is this optimal error rate possible to obtain in an oracle-efficient manner, or
is the
√
m error overhead that comes with our approach necessary for oracle efficiency?
Our PRSMA algorithm shows how to generically reduce from an oracle-dependent guarantee
of differential privacy to a guarantee of robust differential privacy — but at a cost, both in terms
of running time, and in terms of error. Are these costs necessary? Without further assumptions
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on the construction of the oracle, it seems difficult to avoid the O(1/δ)-overhead in running time,
but perhaps there are natural assumptions that can be placed on the failure-mode of the oracle
that can avoid this. It is less clear whether the error overhead that we introduce — by running
the original algorithm on an ǫ fraction of the dataset, with a privacy parameter ǫ′ ≈ 1/√ǫn — is
necessary. Doing this is a key feature of our algorithm and analysis, because we take advantage
of the fact that differentially private algorithms are actually distributionally private when ǫ′ is set
this small — but perhaps it can be avoided entirely with a different approach.
Our barrier result takes advantage of a connection between differentially private learnabil-
ity and online learnability. Because private pERM algorithms can be used efficiently as no-regret
learning algorithms, they are subject to the lower bounds on oracle-efficient online learning proven
in [HK16]. But perhaps the connection between differentially private learnability and online
learnability runs deeper. Can every differentially private learning algorithm be used in a black
box manner to efficiently obtain a no-regret learning algorithm? Note that it is already known
that private learnability implies finite Littlestone dimension, so the open question here concerns
whether there is an efficient blackbox reduction from private ERM algorithms to online learning
algorithms. If true, this would convert our barrier for pERM algorithms into a full lower-bound
for oracle-efficient private learning algorithms generally.
Finally, a more open ended question — that applies both to our work and to work on ora-
cle efficiency in machine learning more generally — concerns how to refine the model of oracle
efficiency. Ideally, the learning problems fed to the oracle should be “natural” — e.g. a small
perturbation or re-weighting of the original (non-private) learning problem, as is the case for the
algorithms we present in our paper. This is desirable because presumably we believe that the
heuristics which can solve hard learning problems in practice work for “natural” instances, rather
than arbitrary problems. However, the definition for oracle efficiency that we use in this paper
allows for un-natural algorithms. For example, it is possible to show that the problem of sampling
from the exponential mechanism of [MT07] defined by rational valued quality scores that are effi-
ciently computable lies in BPPNP — in other words, the sampling can be done in polynomial time
given access to an oracle for solving circuit-satisfiability problems4. This implies in particular,
that there exists an oracle efficient algorithm (as we have defined them) for any NP hard learning
problem — because the learning oracle can be used as an arbitrary NP oracle via gadget reduc-
tions5. The same logic implies that there are oracle efficient no-regret learning algorithms for any
class of experts for which offline optimization is NP hard — because an NP oracle can be used to
sample from the multiplicative weights distribution. But these kinds of gadget reductions seem
to be an abuse of the model of oracle efficiency, which currently reduces to all of BPPNP when
the given oracle is solving an NP hard problem6. Ambitiously, might there be a refinement of the
4This construction is due to Jonathan Ullman and Salil Vadhan (personal communication). It starts from the ability
to sample uniformly at random amongst the set of satisfying assignments of an arbitrary polynomially sized boolean
circuit given an NP oracle, using the algorithm of [BGP00]. For any distribution P such that there is a polynomi-
ally sized circuit C for which the relative probability mass on any discrete input x can be computed by C(x), we can
construct a boolean circuit C′ that computes for bounded bit-length rational numbers w: C′(x,w) = 1 if C(x) ≥ w.
The marginal distribution on elements x when sampling uniformly at random from the satisfying assignments of this
circuit is P .
5Note that this procedure is not robustly differentially private, since sampling from the correct distribution occurs
only if the oracle does not fail. But it could be fed into our PRSMA algorithm to obtain robust privacy. It also does
not solve synthetic data generation oracle efficiently because the quality score used for synthetic data generation in
[BLR13] is not computable by a polynomially sized circuit generally.
6This does not contradict the lower bound of [HK16] for oracle efficient online learning, or our barrier re-
36
model of oracle efficiency that requires one to prove a utility theorem along the following lines:
assuming an oracle which can with high probability solve learning problems drawn from the ac-
tual data distribution, the oracle efficient algorithm will (with slightly lower probability) solve
the private learning problem when the underlying instance is drawn from the same distribution.
Theorems of this sort would be of great interest, and would (presumably) rule out “unnatural”
algorithms relying on gadget reductions.
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A Examples of Separator Sets
A.1 Separator Sets for Empirical Loss Queries
In this section we show how to construct a separator set for a family of empirical loss queries
defined over a hypothesis class, given a separator set for the corresponding hypothesis class. For-
mally, let us consider the data domain X to be the set of labelled examples XA × {0,1}, where XA
is the domain of attribute vectors. Let H be a hypothesis class, with each hypothesis h : Xa → {0,1}
mapping attribute vectors to binary labels. Let UH be a separator set for H such that for any pair
of distinct hypotheses h,h′ ∈ H, there is a u ∈UH such that h(u) , h′(u).
For every h ∈ H, let qh : X → {0,1} be the loss query corresponding to h such that qh((x,y)) =
1[h(x) , y]. Define the query class QH to be {qh | h ∈ H}, and let U = {(u,0) | u ∈ UH}. Solving the
learning problem over H corresponds to solving the minimization problem over QH.
Claim 1. The set U is a separator set for the query class QH.
Proof. Let qh,qh′ ∈ QH be a pair of distinct queries. Since UH is a separator set for H, there exists
an element u ∈UH such that h(u) , h(u ′). As a result,
qh((u,0)) = h(u) , h(u
′) = qh′ ((u,0)).
Therefore, U is a separator set for QH.
Thus, if a hypothesis classH has a separator set of size m, so does the set of queries QH repre-
senting the empirical loss of the hypotheses h ∈ H.
A.2 Separator Sets for Common Hypothesis Classes
In this section we provide some examples of hypothesis classes with small separator sets. We say
that a class of queries Q is self-dual of Q =Qdual.
A.2.1 Conjunctions, Disjunctions, and Parities
We begin with some easy but important cases that can be verified by inspection:
Fact 1. Let XA = {0,1}d . For every j ∈ [d], let ej ∈ XA be a boolean vector that has 1 in the j-th coordinate
and 0 in all others, and let ej ∈ XA be the vector that has 0 in the j-th coordinate and 1 in all others. Let
U = {ej | j ∈ [d]} and U = {ej | j ∈ [d]}. Then for the following hypothesis classes:
• U is a separator set for conjunctions over XA: {∧j∈Sxj | S ⊆ [d]};
• U is a separator set for disjunctions over XA: {∨j∈Sxj | S ⊆ [d]};
• U is a separator set for parities over XA: {⊕j∈Sxj | S ⊆ [d]}.
Hence, each of these classes has a separator set of size d, equal to the data dimension. Moreover, each of
these classes is self-dual.
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Remark 4. Note here we have defined monotone conjunctions, disjunctions, and parities — i.e. in
which the literals cannot appear negated. Up to a factor of 2 in the dimension, this is without loss
of generality, since we can add d extra coordinates to each example which by convention will encode
the negation of each of the values in the first d coordinates. This allows us to handle non-monotone
conjunctions, disjunctions, and parities as well.
A.2.2 Discrete Halfspaces
Discrete halfspaces are a richer set of hypotheses that generalize both conjunctions and disjunc-
tions. Let XA = Bd for some set B ⊆ [−1,1]. For example we could allow real valued features by
letting B = [−1,1], or we could take some discretization. We will assume that 0 ∈ B. Halfspaces
themselves will be defined with respect to vectors of weights w that are discretized to lie in some
finite setw ∈ V d , for V ⊆ [−1,1]. Here we could take |V | = 2 by requiring that theweights be defined
over the hypercube (V = {−1,1}), or we could allow finer discretization. It is important that V be
finite.
Definition 15 (Halfspace Query). Given a weight vector w ∈ V d , the halfspace query parameterized
by w is defined to be qw(x) = 1{w · x ≥ 1}. Let QV = {qw : w ∈ V d}.
The value of “1” used as the intercept is arbitrary, and can is set without loss of generality at the cost
of 1 extra data dimension.
Lemma 15. QV has a separator set of size (|V | − 1)d. In particular, if weights are defined over the
hypercube (V = {−1,1}), then the separator set is of size d.
Proof. Suppose the elements of V are x1 < x2 < . . . < x|V |, which without loss of generality are
distinct. We construct a separator set of size (|V | − 1)d as follows. Let c1, . . . c|V |−1 be a sequence
such that cv lies in [
1
xv+1
, 1xv ). Define the vector sjv ∈ X to take value cv in coordinate j, and 0
elsewhere. We claim that U = {sjv}j=1,...d,v=1...|V |−1 is a separator set for QV . Let qw1 , qw2 ∈ QV .
Since w1 , w2 they must differ in some coordinate, call it k. Let w1,k = xl ,q2,k = xm, and without
loss of generality assume xm > xl . Then by construction of {cv } there exists cv such that cv ≥ 1xm ,
but cv <
1
xl
. We therefore have that w1 · skv = xl · cv < 1, whereas w2 · skv = xm · cv ≥ 1, and hence
qw1(skv) = 0 , 1 = qw2(skv).
Finally, we note that the dual of QV is QB — and so if B = V , the set of halfspace queries QV is
self-dual.
A.2.3 Decision Lists
For simplicity, in this section we discuss monotone decision lists, in which variables cannot be
negated — but as we have already remarked, this is without loss of generality up to a factor of
2 in the dimension. Here we define the general class of k-decision lists: 1-decision lists (often
just referred to as decision lists) are a restricted class of binary decision tree in which one child of
every internal vertex must be a leaf. k-decision lists are a generalization in which each branching
decision can depend on a conjunction of k variables.
Definition 16. A monotone k-decision list over XA = {0,1}d is defined by an ordered sequence L =
(c1,b1), . . . , (cl ,bl ) and a bit b, in which each ci is a monotone conjunction of at most k literals, and each
bi ∈ {0,1}. Given a pair (L,b), the decision list qL,b(x) computes as follows: it outputs qL,b(x) = bj where
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j is the minimum index in L satisfying cj (a) = 1. If cj is the first conjunction that x satisfies in the
definition of qL,b(x) we say that x binds at cj . If no such index exists then qL,b(x) = b, and we say qL,b(x)
does not bind. k-decision lists are strict generalizations of k-DNF and k-CNF formulae.
Lemma 16. The class of k-decision lists has a separator set of size ≤∑2kj=0 (dj ). In particular, 1-decision
lists have a separator set of size O(d2).
Proof. Let MCk denote the set of monotone conjunctions of ≤ k literals over XA. For any two s, l
inMCk , let esl denote the element a ∈ XA such that all literals appearing in either s or l are set to
1, and all others are set to 0. Define U = {esl : s, l ∈ MCk}. Since each esl corresponds to setting
between 0 and 2k of the d variables to 1, there are
∑2k
j=0
(d
j
)
elements in U .
Now let (L1,b1) , (L2,b2) be two distinct k-decision lists. Since the two decision lists are distinct
there must exist x ∈ XA such that q(L1,b1)(x) , q(L2,b2)(x). Let c1, c2 be the conjunctions on which
(L1,b1), (L2,b2) bind on x respectively. (If Li does not bind on x, set ci to be the empty conjunction).
Define ec1,c2 ∈ U as above. We claim that q(L1,b1)(ec1,c2) = q(L1,b1)(x) , q(L2,b2)(x) = q(L2,b2)(ec1,c2), and
hence ec1,c2 ∈ U distinguishes (L1,b1) from (L2,b2), which proves the claim. The key fact that
q(Li ,bi )(ec1,c2) = q(Li ,bi )(x) follows from the fact that (Li ,bi ) still binds at ci (or does not bind at all) on
input x, and it can’t bind earlier since any monotone conjunction satisfied by ec1,c2 is satisfied by
x.
A.2.4 Other Classes of Functions
In this section, we have exhibited simple constructions of small universal identification sets for
conjunctions, disjunctions, parities, discrete halfspaces, and k-decision lists. This is not an ex-
haustive enumeration of such classes — we give these as examples of the most frequently studied
classes of boolean functions in the PAC learning literature. However, short universal identification
sets for other classes of functions are known. For example:
Theorem 17 ([GKS93]). There exist polynomially sized universal identification sets for the following
two classes of circuits:
1. Logarithmic depth read-once majority formulas, and
2. Logarithmic depth read-once positive NAND formulas.
B RSPMwith Gaussian Perturbations
We now present a Gaussian variant of the RSPM algorithm.
Theorem 18 (Utility). The Gaussian RSPM algorithm is an oracle-efficient (α,β)-minimizer for Q for:
α =O
m
√
m ln(2m/β) ln(1/δ)
εn

Proof. Note that for each noise variable ηi , we have the following tail bound:
Pr[|ηi | ≥ t] ≤ 2exp
(
− t
2
2σ2
)
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Gaussian RSPM
Given: A separator set U = {e1, . . . , em} for a class of statistical queries Q and a weighted optimiza-
tion oracle O∗ for Q, privacy parameters ǫ and δ ∈ (0,1/e), and σ = 3.5
√
m ln(1/δ)
ε .
Input: A dataset S ∈ X n of size n.
Output: A statistical query q ∈ Q.
Sample independently ηi ∼N (0,σ2) for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
Construct a weighted datasetWD of size n+m as follows:
WD(S,η) = {(xi ,1) : xi ∈ S} ∪ {(ei ,ηi ) : ei ∈U }
Output q = O(WD(S,η)).
Taking a union bound, we have with probability at least 1− β that
max
i
|ηi | ≤
√
2ln(2m/β)σ
Then the proof follows from the same reasoning in the proof for Theorem 5.
Theorem19 (Privacy). IfO∗ is a weighted optimization oracle forQ, then the Gaussian Report Separator-
Perturbed Min algorithm is (ǫ,δ)-differentially private.
Proof. In the following, we will inherit the notation from Section 3. We will denote the out-
put by the algorithm on input dataset S under realizations of the perturbations η as Q(S,η) =
O∗(WD(S,η)). For any q ∈ Q, let E(q,S) = {η : Q(S,η) = q}. We will use the same mapping
fq(η) : R
m → Rm as defined in Section 3. We will write PG to denote the pdf of the distribution
N (0,σ2). Wewill also again define the set B as the set of η for which there are multipleminimizers
qˆ. For every η ∈Rm\B, let qˆη be the uniqueminimizer. Note that Lemmas 2 and 4 both hold in our
setting, and in particular, Lemma 4 holds because of the continuity of the Gaussian distribution.
Similar to the standard analysis for the Gaussian mechanism [DR14], we will leverage the fact
that the distributionN (0,σ2I ) is independent of the orthonormal basis from which its constituent
normals are drawn, so we have the freedom to choose the underlying basis without changing the
distribution. For any r ∈ Rm and any q ∈ Q, fix such a basis b1, . . . ,bm such that b1 is parallel to
ν = fq(r)− r. A random draw η fromN (0,σ2I ) can be realized by the following process: first draw
signed lengths λi ∼ N (0,σ2), for i ∈ [m], then define η[i] = λibi , and finally let η =
∑m
i=1 η
[i]. For
each i ∈ [m], let r[i] be the projection of r onto the direction of bi , which gives r =
∑m
i=1 r
[i].
Lemma 17. Suppose that σ > 1. For any r ∈ Rm, q ∈ Q,
PG(r) ≤ exp
(
1
2σ2
(
m+2
√
m‖r[1]‖2
))
PG(fq(r)).
Proof. Note that for any r ∈Rm, we have
PG(r) =
1
(2π)m/2σm
exp
(
−‖r‖
2
2
2σ2
)
.
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We will write ν = fq(r)− r. It follows that
PG(r)
PG(fq(r))
= exp
(
1
2σ2
(
‖r + ν‖22 − ‖r‖22
))
Now we can write
‖r + ν‖22 = ‖ν + r[1]‖22 +
m∑
i=1
‖r[i]‖22, ‖r‖22 =
m∑
i=1
‖r[i]‖22.
It follows that
‖r[1] + ν‖22 − ‖r[1]‖22 = ‖ν‖22 +2‖ν‖2 ‖r[1]‖2 ≤m+2
√
m‖r[1]‖2
This means
PG(r)
PG(fq(r))
≤ exp
(
1
2σ2
(
m+2
√
m‖r[1]‖2
))
,
which completes the proof.
To finish up the privacy analysis, note that by Lemma 17, the ratio PG(η)/PG(fq(η)) is bounded
by exp(ε), as long as ‖η[1]‖2 < σ2ε/
√
m−√m/2. Now we will bound the probability that the random
vector η[1] has norm exceeding this bound. First, observe that ‖η[1]‖2 = |λ1|, where λ1 is a random
draw from the distribution N (0,σ2). Since λ21 is a χ2 random variable with degree of freedom 1,
we can apply the following tail bound [LM00]: for any t > 0,
Pr[λ21 ≥ σ2
(√
2t +1
)2
] ≤ exp(−t)
which can be further simplied to
Pr[‖η[1]‖2 ≥ σ
(√
2t +1
)
] ≤ exp(−t)
In other words, for any δ ∈ (0,1/e), with probability at least 1− δ, we have
‖η[1]‖2 < σ(
√
2ln(1/δ) + 1) ≡Λ
It follows that Λ ≤ σ2ε/√m − √m/2, as long as σ = c
√
m ln(1/δ)
ε for any c ≥ 3.5. We will use this
value of σ for the remainder of the analysis. Now let L = {η ∈Rm | ‖η[1]‖2 >Λ}, then we know that
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Pr[η ∈ L] < δ. Let S ⊂ Q be a subset of queries. It follows that:
Pr
η ∈
⋃
qˆ∈S
E(qˆ,S)
 =
∫
Rm
PG(η)1
η ∈
⋃
qˆ∈S
E(qˆ,S)
dη
=
∫
(Rm\B)\L
PG(η)1
η ∈
⋃
qˆ∈S
E(qˆ,S)
dη +
∫
L
PG(η)1
η ∈
⋃
qˆ∈S
E(qˆ,S)
dη
≤
∫
(Rm\B)\L
PG(η)1
η ∈
⋃
qˆ∈S
E(qˆ,S)
dη + δ
=
∑
qˆ∈S
∫
Rm\(B∪L)
PG(η)1 (η ∈ E(qˆ,S))dη + δ
≤
∑
qˆ∈S
∫
Rm\(B∪L)
PG(η)1
(
fqˆ(η) ∈ E(qˆ,S ′)
)
dη + δ (Lemma 2)
≤
∑
qˆ∈S
∫
Rm\(B∪L)
exp(ε)PG(fqˆ(η))1
(
fqˆ(η) ∈ E(qˆ,S ′)
)
dη + δ (Lemma 17)
=
∑
qˆ∈S
∫
Rm\(fqˆ(B)∪fqˆ(L))
exp(ε)PG(η)1 (η ∈ E(qˆ,S ′))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∂fqˆ∂η
∣∣∣∣∣∣dη + δ
≤ exp(ε)
∑
qˆ∈S
∫
Rm
PG(η)1 (η ∈ E(qˆ,S ′))dη + δ
(
∀qˆ,
∣∣∣∣∣∣∂fqˆ∂η
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1
)
= exp(ε)Pr
η ∈
⋃
qˆ∈S
E(qˆ,S ′)
+ δ
This completes the proof.
C Proofs and Details for Theorem 8
Lemma 1. Let AO be a certifiable-oracle dependent algorithm that is oracle equivalent to A. Then
for any fixed input dataset S , there exists a coupling between A(S) and AO(S) such that Pr[AO(S) =
a|AO(S) ,⊥] = Pr[A(S) = a|AO (S) ,⊥].
Proof. We can assume without loss of generality that AO and A draw all their randomness up
front in the form of a random seed η, and are then a deterministic function of the random seed
and the input dataset. By definition, during the run of AO , the algorithm generates a (possibly
randomized, and possibly adaptively chosen) sequence of inputs to the optimization oracle O,
{wd1, . . .wdm}, where each wdi is a weighted dataset. We denote the output of the ith optimization
problem by oi . After the m
th optimization problem, AO outputs a deterministic outcome a =
h(o1, o2, . . . om). Given access to a perfect optimization oracle O∗, AO∗ is simply A – this is the
definition of oracle equivalence. We construct a coupling between an algorithmM and AO , and
then argue runningM is the same as runningA:
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Input: A dataset S , random seed η, heuristic oracle O, perfect oracle O∗.
Output: valuesM(S,η),A(S,η)
Run AO(η,S) - generating the first optimization problem wd1.
for i = 1 . . .m do
Compute oi =O(wdi)
if oi =⊥ then
Output AO(S,w) = ⊥
Set oi =O∗(wdi)
end if
Generate wdi+1 adaptively as a function of previous outputs (oi , oi−1, . . . o1)
end for
OutputM(S,η) = h(o1, . . . om) = a
if AO(S,η) = ⊥ has not been output then
Output AO(S,w) = a
end if
The procedure starts by generating a random seed η and initializing a run of AO(η,S) - gen-
erating the first optimization problem wd1. If the oracle O fails on input wd1,AO outputs ⊥. In
this case the next optimization input wd2 is generated as a function of the output of the perfect
oracle O∗(wd1). If it succeeds, we simply generate the next output as a function of O(wd1) (which
is the same as O∗(wd1) by definition of certifiability). This process continues until we solve the
mth optimization problem, and outputM(η,S),AO (η,S) as described above. Now it is clear that if
the oracle doesn’t fail, we generate the same output a for AO and M. No matter whether or not
O fails,M has output that corresponds to perfectly solving the optimization problems generated
with input S,η, and so it is equivalent to runningA. Moreover, whenever the oracle does not fail,
A andM have the same output, by construction. This completes the proof.
Definition 17 ([PP14]). Let (X1, . . . ,Xn) ⊂ {0,1}n be an ensemble of n {0,1}-valued random variables.
We say that (X1, . . .Xn) satisfy the stochastic covering property, if for any I ⊂ [n], J = [n]\I , and a ≥
a′ ∈ {0,1}|I |, where ≥ denotes coordinate-wise dominance, such that ||a′ − a||1 = 1, there is a coupling v
of the distributions µ,µ′ on (Xk)k∈J conditioned on (Xk)k∈I = a or (Xk)k∈I = a′ respectively, such that
v(x,y) = 0 unless x ≤ y and ||x − y||1 ≤ 1.
Lemma 18. Given a set |S | = n, subsample k ≤ n elements without replacement. Let Xi ∈ {0,1} be 1 if
element xi ∈ S is subsampled, else 0. Then (X1, . . .Xn) satisfy the stochastic covering property.
Proof. For a ∈ {0,1}|I | let |a| be the number of 1’s in a. Then the distribution of x = XJ |a corresponds
to subsampling k − |a| elements from (xk)k∈J , and the distribution of y = XJ |a′ corresponds to sub-
sampling k−|a|+1 elements from (xk)k∈J without replacement. To establish the stochastic covering
property, we exhibit a coupling v of x,y:
To generate y subsample k − |a| + 1 elements from (xk)k∈J without replacement. Let x be the first
k − |a| such elements subsampled. Both x,y constructed as such have the correct marginal distri-
butions, and by construction x ≤ y, ||x − y||1 = 1 always.
Definition 18. (X1, . . . ,Xn) ⊂ {0,1}n are k-homogenous if Pr[
∑n
i=1Xi = k] = 1.
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Theorem 20 (Theorem 3.1 in [PP14]). Let (X1, . . .Xn) ∈ {0,1} be k-homogenous random variables
satisfying the stochastic covering property. Let f : {0,1}n → R be an ǫ−Lipschitz function, and let
µ =E [f (X1, . . .Xn)]. Then for any t > 0:
Pr[|f (X1, . . .Xn)−µ| ≥ t] ≤ 2e
−t2
8ǫ2k
Lemma 5. Let P (S) ∼ P Ssplit . Let A : X l → M be an (ǫ′ ,0) differentially private algorithm, where:
ǫ′ = 1√
8 nK log(2K/δ)
. Fix Ω ⊂M , and let qΩ(Si) = logPr[A(Si) ∈Ω]. Define Q to be the event
Q = {P (S) : max
i,j∈1...K
|qΩ(Si)− qΩ(Sj )| ≤ 2}.
Then over the random draw of P (S) ∼ P Ssplit , Pr[Q] ≥ 1− δ.
Proof. Fix any index k of the partition. Let {Xi}ni=1 be the indicator random random variables
indicating that element i in S , is included in Sk . Since Sk is entirely determined by {Xi}, we can
write qΩ(Sk) as a function of {Xi}, e.g. qΩ(X1, . . .Xn). Moreover, by definition of ǫ-differential
privacy, qΩ is ǫ-Lipschitz, i.e. for any Xi ,X
′
i :
|qΩ(X1, . . .Xi , . . .Xn)− qΩ(X1, . . .X ′i , . . .Xn)| ≤ ǫ
By Lemma 18 proven in the Appendix, (X1, . . .Xn) satisfy what is called the stochastic covering
property, a type of negative dependence. Since |Sk | = n/K , (X1, . . .Xn) are n/K-homogenous. Thus
by Theorem 1 of [PP14], with probability 1− δ/K :
|qΩ(Sk)− E
Sk∼P Ssplit
[qΩ(Sk)] | ≤ ǫ′
√
8
n
K
log(2K/δ) = 1
So by a union bound this holds for all k = 1 . . .K with probability at least 1 − δ. Since for all
i, j,ESi∼P Ssplit [qΩ(Si)] = ESj∼P Ssplit
[
qΩ(Sj )
]
, by the triangle inequality for all i, j, |qΩ (Si) − qΩ(Sj )| ≤ 2
with probability 1− δ, as desired.
Lemma 6.
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω]
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
≤
∑
P (S)∈SQ,o∈F
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] + 4δ
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
Proof. Conditioning on L and using Pr[L] ≥ 1− 2δ we have:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) = a]
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
≤
2δ+Pr
[
AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|L
]
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
Expanding Pr
[
AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|L
]
by conditioning on F ,P (S) and using the law of total probability
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we have:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) = a|L]
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
=
∑
P (S),o∈F
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L]
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
= (12)
Separating the summation in the numerator over P (S) into SQ,ScQ we have:
∑
P (S),o∈F
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] =
∑
P (S)∈SQ,o∈F
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] +
∑
P (S)∈ScQ,o∈F
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L]
Rewriting the second term,∑
P (S)∈ScQ,o∈F
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] =
∑
P (S)∈ScQ
(
∑
o∈F
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L]Pr[o, |P(S),L])Pr[P(S)|L] =
∑
P (S)∈ScQ
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),L])Pr[P(S)|L] ≤
∑
P (S)∈ScQ
Pr[P(S)|L] = Pr[Qc |L]
The first equality follows from the fact that Pr[o,P (S)|L] = Pr[o|P (S),L]Pr[P (S)|L], and the second
equality follows from the law of total probability. Since Pr[Qc] ≤ δ, and Pr[L] ≥ 1− 2δ, Pr[Qc |L] ≤
δ/(1− 2δ) ≤ 2δ, for δ ≤ 1/4. Thus
Pr[AprsmO (S ) = a|L]
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
≤
∑
P (S)∈SQ,o∈F
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] + 2δ
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
Combining this bound, with the bound
Pr[AprsmO (S)=a]
Pr[AprsmO (S ′ )∈Ω]
≤ 2δ+Pr[A
prsm
O (S)∈Ω|L]
Pr[AprsmO (S ′ )∈Ω]
, establishes the result.
Lemma 7. Fix any o, any P (S) ∈ SQ, and index j ∈ Iopass , i.e. oj ,⊥. Then:
Pr[AO(Sj ) ∈Ω|AO(Sj ) ,⊥,L] ≤
e2
(1− δ)2
1
|o| − 1
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,j
Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO(Si) ,⊥] +
δe2
(1− δ)
Proof of Lemma 7. By Equation 3, we know:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L] =
1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass
Pr[AO(Si) = a|AO(Si) ,⊥]
We also know that since we’ve conditioned on L (and hence on E), for each i ∈ Iopass on the RHS
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of the above equation, Pr[AO(Si) = ⊥] ≤ δ. By Lemma 1, we know that there exists a coupling
between AO(Si) and A(Si ) such that Pr[AO(Si) = a|AO(Si) ,⊥] = Pr[A(Si) = a|AO(Si) ,⊥].
By the law of total probability:
Pr[A(Si) = a] = Pr[A(Si) = a|AO(Si) ,⊥]Pr[AO(Si) ,⊥] + Pr[A(Si) = a|AO(Si) = ⊥]Pr[AO(Si) = ⊥]
Then Pr[A(Si) = a|AO(Si) , ⊥]Pr[AO(Si) , ⊥] ≤ Pr[A(Si) = a] =⇒ Pr[A(Si) = a|AO (Si) , ⊥] ≤
1
1−δ Pr[A(Si) = a], and similarly Pr[A(Si) = a|AO(Si) ,⊥] ≥ Pr[A(Si) = a]− δ.
Since we’ve shown that each of the conditional probabilities Pr[AO(Si) = a|AO(Si) ,⊥] is close
to Pr[AO(Si) = a], since we assume P (S) ∈ SQ, we know they are close to each other. Using the
inequalities above:
Pr[A(Sj ) = a|oj ,⊥] ≤
1
1− δ Pr[A(Sj ) = a] ≤
e2
1− δ Pr[A(Si) = a] ≤
e2
1− δ (
Pr[A(Si) = a|oi ,⊥]
1− δ + δ),
where the middle inequality follows from the definition of SQ. Summing both sides over i : oi ,
⊥, i , j and rearranging gives the desired result.
Lemma 8. ∑
P (S)∈SQ,o∈F
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] ≤
(1 +
e2
(1− δ)2(1ǫ − 1)
)
∑
P(S)∈SQ
(∑
o∈F
( 1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,1
Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO(Si) ,⊥]
)
Pr[o|P(S)]
)
Pr[P(S)] +
ǫδe2
1− δ
Proof. Denote
∑
P(S)∈SQ
( ∑
o∈F :o1,⊥
( 1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass
Pr[AO(Si) = a|AO(Si) ,⊥]
)
Pr[o|P(S)], by (⋆). By Lemma 7,
(⋆) ≤
∑
P(S)∈SQ
( ∑
o∈F :o1,⊥
( δe2
(1− δ)|o|+(1+
e2
(|o| − 1)(1− δ)2 )·
1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,1
Pr[AO(Si) = a|AO(Si) ,⊥, i∗ = i]
)
Pr[o|P(S)]
)
Pr[P(S)]
Pulling out the δe
2
(1−δ)|o| , we see that
∑
o∈F :o1,⊥
δe2
(1− δ)|o| Pr[o|P(S)] ≤
∑
o∈F
δe2
(1− δ) · ǫPr[o|P(S)] =
ǫδe2
(1− δ) .
Here we’ve used the fact that |o| > 1ǫ . Similarly,
∑
P(S)∈SQ
ǫδe2
(1− δ) Pr[P(S)] ≤
ǫδe2
(1− δ) . Applying to (⋆),
we get:
(⋆) ≤
∑
P(S)∈SQ
( ∑
o∈F :o1,⊥
(
(1+
e2
(1− δ)2(1ǫ − 1)
)· 1|o|
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,1
Pr[AO(Si) = a|AO(Si) ,⊥, i∗ = i]
)
Pr[o|P(S)]
)
Pr[P(S)]+
ǫδe2
1− δ
(13)
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Applying this upper bound on (⋆) gives:∑
P (S)∈SQ ,o∈F
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L] ≤
∑
P(S)∈SQ
(( ∑
o∈F :o1,⊥
(
(1 +
e2
(1− δ)2(1ǫ − 1)
) · 1|o|
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,1
Pr[AO(Si) = a|AO(Si) ,⊥, i∗ = i]
)
Pr[o|P(S)]
)
+
∑
o∈F :o1=⊥
( 1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass
Pr[AO(Si) = a|AO(Si) ,⊥, i∗ = i]Pr[o|P(S)
))
Pr[P(S)] ≤
(1 +
e2
(1− δ)2(1ǫ − 1)
)
∑
P(S)∈SQ
(∑
o∈F
( 1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,1
Pr[AO(Si) = a|AO(Si) ,⊥, i∗ = i]
)
Pr[o|P(S)]
)
Pr[P(S)]
End of proof of Theorem 8.
Proof. First we rewrite the numerator:
∑
o∈F
( 1
|o|
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,1
Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO(Si) ,⊥]Pr[o|P(S)]
)
=
∑
o−1∈F
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,1
(( 1
|o−1|
Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO(Si) ,⊥]Pr[o1 =⊥,o−1|P(S)] +
1
|o−1 +1|
Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO(Si) ,⊥]Pr[o1 = 1,o−1|P(S)]
))
≤
∑
o−1∈F
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,1
( 1
|o−1| − 1
Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO(Si) ,⊥]Pr[o−1|P(S)]
)
,
where we’ve used the fact that Pr[o1 = ⊥,o−1|P(S)] + Pr[o1 , ⊥,o−1|P(S)] = Pr[o−1|P(S)]. Similarly,
we can use this same trick to lower bound the denominator:∑
o∈F
∑
i∈Iopass
(
1
|o| Pr[AO(S
′
i ) ∈Ω|AO(S ′i ) ,⊥]Pr[o|P(S ′)]) ≥
∑
o−1∈F
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,1
(
1
|o−1|
Pr[AO(S ′i ) ∈Ω|AO (S ′i ) ,⊥]Pr[o1 ,⊥,o−1|P(S ′)] +
1
|o−1| − 1
Pr[AO(S ′i ) ∈Ω|AO(S ′i ) ,⊥]Pr[o1 = ⊥,o−1|P(S ′)]) ≥
∑
o−1∈F
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,1
( 1
|o−1|
Pr[AO(S ′i ) ∈Ω|AO(S ′i ) ,⊥]Pr[o−1|P(S ′)]
)
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Substituting these inequalities into (5), we get that (5) ≤
sup
P(S)∼P(S ′)
(1 + e
2
(1−δ)2( 1ǫ−1)
)
∑
o−1∈F
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,1
( 1
|o−1| − 1
Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO(Si) ,⊥]Pr[o−1|P(S)]
)
∑
o−1∈F
∑
i∈Iopass ,i,1
( 1
|o−1|
Pr[AO(S ′i ) ∈Ω|AO(S ′i ) ,⊥]Pr[o−1|P(S ′)]
) + ǫδe
2
1−δ
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
≤
(1+
e2
(1− δ)2(1ǫ − 1)
)· sup
P(S)∼P(S ′),o−1,i,1
1
|o−1 |−1 Pr[AO(Si) ∈Ω|AO(Si) ,⊥]Pr[o−1|P(S)]
1
|o−1 | Pr[AO(S
′
i ) ∈Ω|AO(S ′i ) ,⊥]Pr[o−1|P(S ′)]
+
ǫδe2
1−δ
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
Since Si = S
′
i for all i , 1, this reduces to:
(1+
e2
(1− δ)2(1ǫ − 1)
) ·sup
o−1
|o−1|
|o−1| − 1
+
ǫδe2
1−δ
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
≤ (1+ e
2
(1− δ)2(1ǫ − 1)
)
1
1− ǫ +
ǫδe2
1−δ
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
since |o−1| ≥ 1ǫ by definition.
Following the chain of inequalities back to their genesis, we finally obtain:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω|P(S),o,L]Pr[o,P(S)|L]
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
≤ (1 + e
2
(1− δ)2(1ǫ − 1)
)
1
1− ǫ +
ǫδe2
1−δ
Pr[AprsmO (S ′) ∈Ω]
,
which substituting into Lemma 6 gives:
Pr[AprsmO (S ) ∈Ω] ≤ (1 +
e2
(1− δ)2(1ǫ − 1)
)
1
1− ǫPr[A
prsm
O (S ′) ∈Ω] + 4δ+
ǫδe2
1− δ
For ǫ,δ ≤ 1/2, (1+ e2
(1−δ)2( 1ǫ−1)
) 11−ǫ ≤ e8e
2ǫ+ǫ+ǫ2 , which establishes that PRSMA is (8e2ǫ+ǫ+ǫ2,4δ+
ǫδe2
1−δ ) differentially private. Setting ǫ = ǫ
∗,δ = δ∗ completes the proof.
D Proofs from Section 5
Theorem 13. Let ε,δ ∈ (0,1) and let A be an (ǫ,δ) differentially private pERM algorithm for query
class Q, with perturbation distribution D(ε,δ). Then Follow the Private Leader instantiated with A has
expected regret bounded by:
R(T ) ≤O
(
ǫ+ δ +
EZ∼Dε,δ [‖Z‖∞]
T
)
Proof. This theorem is folklore, and this proof is adapted from the lecture notes of [RS17]. We
introduce some notation. First, write ℓt ∈ R|Q| to denote the “loss vector” faced by the algorithm
at round t, with value qi (x
t) in coordinate i. Write ℓ1:t to denote the summed vector ℓ1:t =
∑t
j=1 ℓ
j .
WriteM : Rd → Rd to denote the function such thatM(v)i∗ = 1where i∗ = argmini vi andM(v)i = 0
otherwise. In this notation, at each round t, “Follow the Leader” obtains loss M(ℓ1:t−1) · ℓt and
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“Follow the Private Leader” obtains lossM(ℓ1:t−1 +Z t) · ℓt . At the end of play, at time T , the best
query q in hindsight obtains cumulative lossM(ℓ1:T ) · ℓ1:T .
The proof of this theorem will go through a thought experiment. Consider an imaginary algo-
rithm called “be the leader”, which at round t plays according to M(ℓ1:t). We will first show that
this imaginary algorithm obtains loss that is only lower than that of the best action in hindsight.
Lemma 19 ([KV05]).
T∑
i=1
M(ℓ1:t) · ℓt ≤M(ℓ1:T ) · ℓ1:T
Proof. This follows by a simple induction on T . For T = 1, it holds with equality. Now assume it
holds for general T – we show it holds for the next time step:
T+1∑
i=1
M(ℓ1:t) ·ℓt ≤M(ℓ1:T ) ·ℓ1:T +M(ℓ1:T+1) ·ℓT+1 ≤M(ℓ1:T+1) ·ℓ1:T +M(ℓ1:T+1) ·ℓT+1 =M(ℓ1:T+1) ·ℓ1:T+1
Recall that private pERM algorithms operate by sampling a perturbation vector Z t ∼ Dǫ,δ at
each round. Next, we show that “be the private leader”, which at round t plays according to
M(ℓ1:t +Z t), doesn’t do much worse.
Lemma 20 ([KV05]). For any set of loss vectors ℓ1, . . . , ℓT and any set of perturbation vectors Z0 ≡
0,Z1, . . . ,ZT :
T∑
t=1
M(ℓ1:t +Z t) · ℓt ≤M(ℓ1:T ) · ℓ1:T +2
T∑
t=1
||Z t −Z t−1||∞
Proof. Define ℓˆt = ℓt +Z t −Z t−1. Note that ℓˆ1:t = ℓ1:t +Z t , since the sum telescopes. Thus, we can
apply Lemma 19 on the sequence ℓˆ to conclude:
T∑
t=1
M(ℓ1:t +Z t) · (ℓt +Z t −Z t−1) ≤ M(ℓ1:T +ZT ) · (ℓ1:T +ZT )
≤ M(ℓ1:T ) · (ℓ1:T +ZT )
= M(ℓ1:T ) · ℓ1:T +
T∑
t=1
M(ℓ1:T ) · (Z t −Z t−1)
Subtracting from both sides, we have:
T∑
t=1
M(ℓ1:t+Z t)·ℓt ≤M(ℓ1:T )·ℓ1:T+
T∑
t=1
(M(ℓ1:T )−M(ℓ1:t+Z t))·(Z t−Z t−1) ≤M(ℓ1:T )·ℓ1:T+
T∑
t=1
2||Z t−Z t−1||∞
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We will use this lemma and a trick to compute the expected regret of “be the private leader”.
Since expectations distribute over sums, we have:
E[
T∑
t=1
M(ℓ1:t +Z t) · ℓt] =
T∑
t=1
E[M(ℓ1:t +Z t) · ℓt]
Hence, the expectation remains unchanged in the thought experiment under which the perturba-
tion is not resampled at every step, and instead Z1 = . . . = Z t ∼ Dǫ,δ. Applying Lemma 20 to this
version of be the private leader, we obtain:
E[
T∑
t=1
M(ℓ1:t +Z t) · ℓt] ≤M(ℓ1:T ) · ℓ1:T +2E[||Z1||∞]
Finally, we use the fact that the algorithm is (ǫ,δ)-differentially private, and the difference be-
tween “follow the private leader” and “be the private leader” amounts to running a differentially
private algorithm on one of two datasets. For any (ǫ,δ) differentially private algorithmA : X ∗→ R,
for any function f : R→ [0,T ], and for any pair of neighboring datasets S,S ′ we have that:
E[f (A(S))] ≤ eǫE[f (A(S ′))] + δT .
We can therefore conclude that for each t:
E[M(ℓ1:t−1 +Z t) · ℓt] ≤ eǫE[M(ℓ1:t +Z t) · ℓt] + δt
Combining this bound with the regret bound we have proven for “be the private leader” yields:
T∑
t=1
E[M(ℓ1:t−1 +Z t) · ℓt] ≤ eǫE[
T∑
t=1
M(ℓ1:t +Z t) · ℓt] + δT ≤ eǫ
(
M(ℓ1:T ) · ℓ1:T +2E[||Z1||∞]
)
+ δT ≤
(1 + 2ǫ)
(
M(ℓ1:T ) · ℓ1:T +2E[||Z1||∞]
)
+ δT ≤M(ℓ1:T ) · ℓ1:T + (2+4ǫ)E[||Z1||∞] + 2ǫT + δT
Dividing by T yields the theorem.
Theorem 15. For any d, there is a fixed finite class of statistical queries Q of size |Q| = N = 2d defined
over a data universe of size |X | =O(N5 log2N ) such that for every online learning algorithm with access
to a weighted optimization oracle for Q, it cannot guarantee that its expected average regret will be o(1)
in total time less than Ω(
√
N/ log3(N )).
Proof. We start by quoting the main ingredient proven in [HK16] that goes into their lower bound:
Theorem 21 ([HK16] Theorem 4). For every N = 2d , and for every randomized algorithm for the play-
ers in the game with access to a best-response oracle, there is an N ×N game with payoffs taking values
in {0,1/4,3/4,1} such that with probability 2/3 the players have not converged to a 1/4-approximate
min-max equilibrium until at least Ω(
√
N/ log3(N )) time.
We start by using the Yao min-max principle to reverse the order of quantifiers: Theorem 21
also implies that there is a fixed distribution over N ×N games that is hard in expectation for every
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algorithm. However, because we will be interested in the support size of this distribution, we go
into a bit more detail in how we apply the min-max principle.
Consider a “meta game” defined by an (infinite) matrixM , with rows i indexed by the L = 4N
2
N ×N zero-sum games Gi taking values in {0,1/4,3/4,1}, and columns indexed by algorithms Aj
instantiated with best-response oracles designed to play zero-sum games. M(i, j) will encode the
expected running time before algorithm Aj when used to play game Gi converges to a value that
is within 1/4 of the equilibrium value of game Gi . Let the row player (the “lower bound” player)
be the maximization player in the zero sum game defined by M , and let the column player (the
“algorithm player”) be the minimization player. As stated, the entries in M can take unbound-
edly large values — but observe that there is a simple modification to the game that allows us
to upper bound the entries in M by O(N logN ). This is because there exists an algorithm A (the
multiplicative weights algorithm — see e.g. [AHK12]) that can be used to play any N ×N game
and converge to a 1/4-approximate equilibrium after time at most O(N logN ) (running in time
O(N ) per iteration for O(logN ) iterations). It is also possible to check whether a pair of distri-
butions form a 1/4 approximate equilibrium with two calls to a best response oracle. Hence, we
can take any algorithm Ai and modify it so that it converges to a 1/4-approximate equilibrium
after at most O(N logN ) time. We simply halt the algorithm after O(N logN ) time if it has not yet
converged, and run the multiplicative weights algorithm A. Theorem 21 implies that the value of
this modified gameM is at leastΩ(
√
N/ log3(N )).
We now observe that the “meta-game” M has an O(1)-approximate max-min strategy for the
lower bound player that has support size at mostO(N4 log2N ). To see this, consider the following
constructive approach to computing an approximate equilibrium: simulate play of the game in
rounds. Let the lower bound player sample a game Gt at each round t using the multiplicative
weights distribution over her L actions, and let the algorithm player best respond at each round to
the lower bound player’s distribution. By construction, the algorithm player has 0 regret, whereas
the lower bound player has regret O(
√
logL/T ·N logN ) after T rounds (since the entries ofM are
bounded between 0 andO(N logN )) This corresponds toO(1) regret after T =O(logL·N2 log2N ) =
O(N4 log2N ) many rounds. By Theorem 11, the empirical distribution over these O(N4 log2N )
many games Gt forms an O(1)-approximate max-min strategy. Thus we have proven:
Corollary 4. For every N = 2d , there is a fixed set H ⊆ {0,1/4,3/4,1}N×N of N ×N games, of size
|H | = O(N4 log2N ) such that for every randomized algorithm A for players in a game with access to a
best response oracle, there is a gameG ∈H such that with probability 2/3, the players have not converged
to a 1/4-approximate min-max equilibrium until at least Ω(
√
N/ log3(N )) time.
Now consider the N × O(N5 log2N ) matrix R that results from stacking the matrices in H.
Identify the N rows with a query class Q of size N , indexed by functions q ∈ Q. Identify the
columns with a data universeX of size |X | =O(N5 log2N ) indexed by x ∈ X , and define the queries
such that q(x) = R(q,x) for each q ∈ Q,x ∈ X . Observe that any no-regret algorithm with action set
Q that can obtain o(1) regret against an adversary who is constrained to play loss vectors in X can
be used to compute an o(1) approximate equilibrium strategy for any game in H (together with
a single call to a best-response oracle per round by his oppoinent, by Theorem 11). Thus we can
conclude that no algorithm can guarantee to get o(1) regret over Q until at least Ω(√N/ log3(N ))
time.
Theorem 16. Any oracle efficient (i.e. running in time poly(n, log |Q|)) (ǫ,δ)-differentially private
pERM algorithm instantiated with a weighted optimization oracle for the query class Q defined in The-
56
orem 15, with perturbation distribution D(ε,δ) must be such that for every (ǫ + δ) = o(1):
EZ∼D(ε,δ)[||Z ||∞] ≥Ω(|Q|c)
for some constant c > 0.
Proof. For any such pERM algorithm A, Let B = EZ∼D(ε,δ)[||Z ||∞]. We know from Theorem 13
that follow the private leader instantiated with A obtains regret o(1) whenever T = ω(B), for
any ǫ + δ = o(1). Since A is oracle efficient (i.e. runs in time poly(t, log |Q|)), the total running
time needed to obtain diminishing regret is
∑T
t=1poly(t, log |Q|) = poly(B, log |Q|). We know from
Theorem 15 that to guarantee diminishing regret over Q, the total running time must be at least
Ω(
√|Q|/ log3(|Q|)). Thus we must have that B = poly(|Q|) — i.e. B =Ω(|Q|c) for some c > 0.
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